310 years ago, on July 8, 1709, the Russian army under the command of Peter I defeated the Swedish army of Charles XII in the Battle of Poltava. The General Battle of Poltava became a strategic turning point in the Northern War in favor of Russia. The “invincible” Swedish army was destroyed, Russian troops went on the offensive and occupied the Baltic states.

Battle of Poltava. Mosaic by M. Lomonosov. Academy of Sciences. Petersburg. 1762–1764. Source: https://ru.wikipedia.org

Baltic question

Northern War 1700-1721 was caused by the struggle of several powers for dominance in the Baltic region. Since ancient times, the Baltic states (the Venedian or Varangian Sea, as the Baltic Sea was then called, were controlled by the Venedian Slavs and Varangian Rus) were part of the sphere of influence of Rus'. The Russian state owned lands on the shores of the Gulf of Finland and the mouth of the Neva. It is also worth remembering that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Russia was originally a Russian state, with a complete predominance of the Russian population and the Russian state language. Thus, Russia’s historical rights to the Baltic states are undeniable.

In the process of the collapse of the Russian state and the onslaught of the West on the East, Russia lost control over the Baltic states. During a series of wars, Sweden captured Karelia and Izhora land, closed the Russians' access to the Baltic Sea, and created a powerful line of fortresses to protect its possessions and further expansion. As a result, Sweden became the leading power in the Baltic, turning the Baltic Sea into its “lake”. This did not suit Russia, which needed access to the sea for military-strategic and trade-economic reasons. The first serious attempt to return to the shores of the Baltic was made by Ivan the Terrible - the Livonian War, but the war resulted in a confrontation with an entire coalition of Western powers and did not lead to victory.

Tsar Peter I made a new attempt to break through to the Baltic. The moment was favorable. The dominance of the Swedes in the Baltic Sea irritated not only Russia, but also other powers - Denmark, Saxony and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which had their own interests in the region and wanted to oust Sweden. In 1699 – 1700 Russia, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Saxony (the Saxon Elector Augustus II was also the Polish king) and Denmark concluded the Northern Alliance directed against the Swedish Empire. Initially, the Western allies planned to use the Russians as “cannon fodder” in the fight against the Swedes and obtain the main fruits of a common victory. However, during the course of the war, the Western allies were defeated, and Russia, despite the first setbacks, on the contrary, grew stronger and became the leading power of the Northern Alliance.

Peter I in the Battle of Poltava. L. Caravaque, 1718

The beginning of the war. Russia returns to the shores of the Baltic

The start of the war was unsuccessful for the Northern Alliance. The young Swedish king Charles XII, a talented commander who dreamed of the glory of Alexander the Great, forestalled his opponents, was the first to launch an offensive and seized the strategic initiative. It is worth noting that Sweden then had the best army and one of the strongest navies in Europe. Karl with a quick blow brought Denmark out of the war - the Swedish-Dutch-English squadron bombarded Copenhagen, and the Swedish landing force landed near the Danish capital. The Danes refused an alliance with Saxony and Russia and promised to pay an indemnity.

Meanwhile, the Saxon army was besieging Riga, and the Russians were besieging Narva. The Saxon king Augustus, having learned of the defeat of Denmark, lifted the siege of Riga and retreated to Courland. This allowed the Swedish king to attack the Russians. In November 1700, the Swedish army, taking advantage of the betrayal of the foreign command in Peter's army, inflicted a decisive defeat on the Russian troops in the Battle of Narva. After this, the Swedish monarch, underestimating the enemy, did not finish off the Russians, and decided to defeat the main enemy (as he believed) - the Saxon Elector. The Swedes chased Augustus across the territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

This allowed the Russian Tsar to “work on his mistakes.” Peter is reducing the number of foreigners in the army, relying on national personnel. Creates a new regular army, builds a fleet, and develops the military industry. Taking advantage of the fact that the main forces of the Swedish army were busy with the war in Poland, the Russian army under the command of B. Sheremetev launched a new offensive in the Baltic states. The Russians crush the Swedish troops under the command of Schlippenbach, liberate the ancient Russian Oreshek (Noteburg) in 1702, and Nevsky Gorodok (Nienschanz) in 1703. The entire course of the river The Neva ends up in Russian hands. Peter founded the Peter and Paul Fortress, Kronshlot and St. Petersburg. They are starting to build a new fleet in the Baltic. The Russian state is consolidated on the shores of the Baltic Sea.

By the end of 1703, the Russian army liberated almost the entire ancient Izhora land (Ingria). In 1704, the Russians liberated the ancient Russian Yuryev (Dorpat) and took Narva. Thus, when Charles’s army turned east again, the Swedes met another Russian army. With Russian commanders and soldiers who have beaten the enemy more than once, and ready to measure their strength with a strong enemy. The Russian army was now different in moral, volitional, organizational and material and technical terms. Russia made its way to the Baltic, gained a foothold there and was ready for a new decisive battle.

Russian campaign of Charles XII

Meanwhile, the Swedish king put an end to Poland and Saxony. He placed his protégé Stanislav Leszczynski on the Polish table. In 1706, the Swedes invaded Saxony, Augustus II capitulated, renounced the alliance with the Russians, the Polish throne and paid indemnity. Russia was left without allies. The Swedish king, having stationed his troops in Saxony to rest, began to prepare a campaign to Russia. Charles XII planned a large-scale invasion of Russia, with the participation of troops of the Ottoman Empire, the Crimean Khanate, Poland and the Cossacks of Hetman Mazepa, who embarked on the path of betrayal. However, this plan was not realized. Porta did not want to fight with Russia at this time. Mazepa's betrayal did not lead to a powerful uprising of the Cossacks in southern Russia. A bunch of traitorous elders who wanted to break away from the Russian Tsar and go under the hands of Sweden or Turkey could not rouse the people against the Russian Tsardom.

True, this did not bother Karl, and in the fall of 1707 he launched an offensive with available forces. Swedish troops crossed the Vistula in November. Menshikov retreated from Warsaw to the Narew River. In February 1708, the Swedes reached Grodno, the Russian troops retreated to Minsk. Tired of the heavy march over the off-road, the Swedish army stopped to rest. In the summer of 1708, the Swedes launched an offensive in the Smolensk direction, aiming at Moscow. Charles's army was to be supported by Levengaupt's corps, which began moving from Riga. In July 1708, the Swedes won a victory at Golovchin. The Russians retreated beyond the Dnieper, the Swedes captured Mogilev.

The further advance of Charles's army slowed down significantly. The Russian command used the “scorched earth” tactic. At this time, the armies “fed” mainly from the surrounding lands, peasants, and their food and fodder reserves. Peter ordered to burn villages, destroy fields, and food supplies that could not be taken out. The Swedish army had to advance through devastated terrain. In September 1708, the Swedish military council decided to temporarily abandon the campaign against Moscow, since winter was approaching and the Swedish army was in danger of starvation. The Swedes decided to turn south, to Little Russia, where Hetman Mazepa promised military assistance, supplies and “winter quarters.” Levengaupt's corps with an artillery park and supplies was supposed to arrive there. However, on September 28 (October 9), 1708, Levenhaupt’s troops were defeated in the Battle of Lesnaya and the Russians captured the reserves of the Swedish army.

King Charles XII and Mazepa on the Dnieper. Painting by Gustav Söderström

Confrontation in Little Russia

In the south, the situation did not develop as smoothly as Mazepa promised. The hetman could not bring 50 thousand to the rescue. army, but only a few thousand Cossacks. In addition, they doubted the correctness of their actions, the Cossacks did not want to fight for the Swedes and their number was constantly dwindling. Menshikov's cavalry got ahead of the enemy and burned Baturin, depriving the enemy of warehouses with supplies. The Swedish army had to go further south, weakening the people with looting. In the winter of 1708, the Swedes stopped in the area of ​​Romny, Priluka and Lubny. The Russian army was positioned to the east, covering the approaches to Belgorod and Kursk. Swedish troops ravaged the surrounding area to obtain provisions and fodder. This caused guerrilla warfare. The Swedes were opposed not only by flying detachments sent by the Russian command, but also by local residents. So, in mid-November, residents of the town of Smely, with the support of a Russian cavalry detachment, defeated a Swedish detachment. The Swedes lost about 900 killed and captured. When the Swedish king arrived with the main forces to punish the rebellious city, its population left the locality. Swedish troops suffered heavy losses during the assault on the Veprik fortress in January 1709.

The Swedes and Russians suffered from an unusually harsh winter. Winter in Little Russia was usually mild, but this year the winter in Europe was severe. The Swedes suffered heavy losses, as they were very worn out during the campaign. In addition, Charles's army was cut off from its bases in the Baltic states, major cities of Poland and Saxony. It was impossible to replenish the artillery park, supplies, ammunition, and ammunition.

Thus, in Little Russia the Swedish army not only did not strengthen, on the contrary, it weakened. The Swedes suffered losses in clashes with Russian troops, Little Russian partisans, and the harsh winter. It was impossible to replenish them. The military-material situation of the army of Charles XII was also constantly deteriorating.

Heroic defense of Veprik (1709). Hood. E. E. Lissner

Siege of Poltava. Preparation for the general battle

In the spring of 1709, the Swedish command planned to resume the attack on Moscow through Kharkov and Belgorod. Karl hoped that Peter would give battle and the Swedish army, which was still considered invincible, would defeat the Russians and dictate peace terms. But before that, the Swedes decided to take Poltava. In April, Swedish troops besieged the fortress. The enemy was counting on a quick victory, since the city had weak fortifications. However, the garrison under the command of Colonel A. Kelin (at the beginning of the siege it numbered a little more than 2 thousand soldiers, then increased to 6 - 7 thousand people, since the enemy was unable to carry out a complete blockade), put up heroic resistance. All the townspeople, including women and children, rose up to defend the city, providing all possible assistance to the fighters, building and repairing fortifications, and helping to repel enemy attacks.

The Swedes, lacking siege artillery and sufficient ammunition, could not wage a full-fledged siege. They tried to take the fortress by storm. From April to June 1709, the Russian garrison repelled 20 assaults and made a number of successful forays. As a result, the “easy walk” turned into protracted and bloody hostilities, during which the Swedes lost over 6 thousand people. The Swedish army got stuck at Poltava, which improved the position of the Russians. The strategic position of Charles's army continued to deteriorate. In May 1709, the Lithuanian hetman Jan Sapieha, a supporter of King Stanislav Leszczynski, was defeated. Now the Swedes were deprived of the opportunity to receive reinforcements from Poland. And Menshikov was able to transfer troops to Poltava, the Swedish army lost contact with the allies. The only hope of the Swedish monarch was a decisive battle with Peter’s army in order to crush the “Russian barbarians” with one blow, despite their superiority in manpower and artillery.

The Russian command also decided that the time for a decisive battle had come. Back on June 13 (24), 1709, our army planned to break the blockade of Poltava. Simultaneously with the offensive of the Russian army, the garrison of the Poltava fortress was supposed to make a sortie. The attack was thwarted by nature: heavy rains raised the level in the river. Vorskla. On June 15 (26), part of the Russian army crossed the Vorskla. The Swedes could attack the Russians during the crossing; this was an opportune moment to strike. However, the enemy showed passivity and allowed all Russian troops to cross the river. On June 19 – 20 (June 30 – July 1), the main forces of the Russian army led by Tsar Peter crossed the river.

The Swedish king Charles showed no interest in engineering preparations for the future battle site. He believed that the Russians would act on the defensive, and he, with a quick and decisive attack of his infantry, would break through their line and inflict defeat. The cavalry will complete the rout. The Swedes could not use artillery, since they spent the remaining ammunition during the siege of Poltava. The Swedish ruler was more concerned about a possible attack from the rear of the Poltava garrison at the most decisive moment of the battle than about the battle with Peter’s army. On the night of June 22 (July 3), the Swedes launched another assault on Poltava, but it was repelled with heavy losses for the enemy. Karl had to leave a detachment near Poltava to repel a possible attack by the garrison.

The Russians built a fortified camp at the crossing point, the village of Petrovka. On June 25 (July 6) the camp was moved to the village of Yakovtsy. The new camp was closer to the enemy and located on rugged, wooded terrain, which limited the maneuver of the Swedish army. The forest prevented the Russian army from flanking. The camp was protected by six redoubts. On June 26 (July 7), Peter ordered the construction of four more redoubts, located perpendicular to the first six. Each redoubt was garrisoned by a company of soldiers, and they were able to support their neighbors with fire. Field fortifications covered the main forces of the Russian army; they had to be taken, suffering losses and wasting time. At this time, the main forces of the Russian army could easily turn around. In addition, the breakthrough through the redoubts upset the battle formations of the Swedish army.

Before the start of the battle, the Swedish army numbered about 37 thousand people (3 thousand Mazepa Cossacks and 8 thousand Cossacks also obeyed the Swedes). The detachment that remained near Poltava and the cavalry units that were located along the Vorskla River until it flows into the Dnieper at Perevolochna, guarding the path to a possible retreat of the army, did not participate in the battle. As a result, Karl could throw up to 25 thousand people into battle, but about 17 thousand people took part in the battle itself. The Swedish king hoped for high morale and professionalism of his army, which until that moment had been invincible and had won many victories in Europe.

The Russian army, according to various estimates, numbered from 50 to 80 thousand people with 100 guns. 25 thousand infantry took part in the battle, but some were just built and did not take part in the battle. The cavalry numbered about 21 thousand people (9 thousand people took part in the battle - mostly dragoons).

The defeat of the "invincible" army

On June 27 (July 8), 1709, at night, the Swedish army under the command of Field Marshal Renschild (the wounded king was carried by his bodyguards on a stretcher) with four columns of infantry and six columns of cavalry secretly began moving towards Russian positions. Karl hoped to crush the enemy with a sudden blow. The Swedish troops deployed in two battle lines: 1st - infantry, 2nd cavalry. At 5 o'clock in the morning the Swedes attacked the redoubts, and immediately took two of them, which had not yet been completed. The garrisons of the other two put up strong resistance. This was an unpleasant surprise for the Swedish command; they only knew about a line of six redoubts. But they did not have time to begin their assault. Shvedov was counterattacked by dragoons under the command of Menshikov and Renne. The Swedish cavalry went ahead of the infantry and started a battle with the Russian cavalry.

The Russian cavalry drove back the enemy and, on Peter's orders, retreated behind the redoubts. The Swedish troops resumed their movement and were met with heavy rifle and cannon fire from the redoubts. The Swedish right-flank columns of Generals Ross and Schlippenbach, separated from the main forces during the battle for the redoubts, having suffered serious losses, retreated to the forest, then they were defeated by the dragoons of General Menshikov. At about 6 o'clock the Russian army formed in two lines for battle. General management was carried out by Sheremetev, the center was commanded by Repnin. The Swedish army, having passed through the line of redoubts, formed into one battle line in order to lengthen its formation. There was a weak reserve in the rear. The cavalry formed on the flanks in two lines.

At 9 o'clock the battle of the main forces began. After a short firefight, the Swedes launched a bayonet attack. Karl was confident that his soldiers would overthrow any enemy. The right wing of the Swedish army, where the Swedish monarch was located, pushed back the battalion of the Novgorod infantry regiment. The Swedes could break through the Russian line. The Russian Tsar personally launched the second battalion of the Novgorod regiment into a counterattack and the Russian soldiers drove back the enemy, closing the breakthrough that had formed in the first line. During the brutal hand-to-hand combat, the Swedish frontal attack fizzled out. Russian troops began to push back the enemy, covering the enemy’s flanks. The Swedes wavered and ran, fearing encirclement. The Swedish cavalry retreated into the Budishchensky forest, followed by the infantry. Only the center of the Swedish army, led by Levenhaupt and the king, tried to cover the retreat to the camp. By 11 o'clock the Swedes were completely defeated.

Denis Martin. Battle of Poltava (1726)

The defeated Swedes fled to the crossings of the Dnieper. Russian losses amounted to 1,345 killed and 3,290 wounded. Swedes' losses were over 9 thousand killed and more than 2800 prisoners. Among the prisoners were Field Marshal Renschild and Chancellor Pieper. The remnants of the fleeing Swedish army reached Perevolochna on June 29 (July 10). Due to the lack of transportation means, it was possible to transport only King Charles and Hetman Mazepa with their entourage and personal guard to the other side of the Dnieper. The remaining troops - 16 thousand people led by Levengaupt - surrendered. King Charles XII and his retinue fled to the Ottoman Empire.

The Battle of Poltava became a strategic turning point in the Northern War. The Russians destroyed and captured the most powerful part of the Swedish army. The strategic initiative completely passed into the hands of the Russian army. Now the Swedes were defending, and the Russians were attacking. Russia received the opportunity to complete the offensive in the Baltic states. The Northern Alliance was restored. A military alliance was again concluded with the Saxon ruler Augustus II in Toruń, and Denmark also again opposed Sweden. Western Europe realized that a new great military power had emerged - Russia.

Kivshenko A.D. Poltava battle. The Swedes bow their banners before Peter I

Image caption On the Poltava Field, the destinies of Russia and Sweden were determined for centuries to come

Both sides who fought there still consider the Battle of Borodino, and not without reason, to be their victory. There is no doubt who won on July 8, 1709 near Poltava: the Swedes were defeated and fled, leaving the battlefield behind the Russians.

Russia, which had previously fought only with the Poles, Tatars and Turks, for the first time defeated the first-class army of a Western European state, led by the famous commander.

“Poltava Victoria” made such an impression on her contemporaries that it became a proverb. In Russia they still say: “beat like a Swede near Poltava.” No other battle received such attention.

Many researchers doubt whether the Battle of Poltava was so grandiose in purely military terms. But in terms of influence on the course of history, few events can compare with it. “The results of Poltava” still determine the fate of Russia, Sweden, and partly all of Europe.

What were they fighting for?

At the beginning of the 17th century, Charles XII's ancestor Gustav Adolf was the first to come up with recruitment kits. Land-poor Swedish nobles willingly served as officers. As a result, Sweden, with a relatively small population, acquired perhaps the strongest professional army in Europe.

Image caption Charles XII became famous for his lightning-fast transitions and ability to beat a superior enemy

During the Thirty Years' War, the Swedes helped North German Protestants achieve complete independence from the Habsburgs, who were no longer called German, but exclusively Austrian emperors. Then they defeated and uprooted the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, taking away the Baltic states from it.

In 1700, 18-year-old Charles XII came to the Swedish throne. For the time being, he showed no signs of making an outstanding military leader, looking more like a frivolous hooligan.

Peter's future ally, the elected Polish king and hereditary Saxon elector Augustus the Strong (he received his nickname because only according to reliable data he was the father of 70 children), used to say that Charles fell into his father's boots, from where it would be nice to pull him out by the collar and punish with rods.

Deciding that with such a ruler it would be possible to oust Sweden without difficulty, Russia, Denmark and Saxony (August the Strong promised to persuade the Polish Diet to join the war) entered into an alliance in 1699 and soon invaded its territory.

You can’t erase the words from the song: in the Northern War, Russia did not defend itself, but attacked.

True, 300 years ago no one saw anything wrong with this. In addition, Peter I sought to return the territories that once belonged to the Novgorod Republic and were lost by the Moscow kings during the Livonian War and the Time of Troubles.

By the way, according to the pre-war agreement, the Baltic states, including Riga, were supposed to go to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Peter only laid claim to the coast of the Gulf of Finland. Subsequently, the fruits of the victory were redistributed in accordance with the real balance of power and the contribution of each of the allies.

The Swedish army numbered about 150 thousand people, plus 13 thousand naval sailors, while Peter alone had an army of 200 thousand at his disposal. But the Swedes were far superior to all their opponents in organization, training and tactics.

Progress of the war

The Saxons entered the war in February 1700, the Danes in August, and Russia in September.

Image caption After the Narva victory, the young king in Europe began to be compared with Alexander the Great

Having knocked Denmark out of the coalition with a swift amphibious landing, Charles landed in Estonia and moved to help the garrison of Narva, which Peter had besieged.

Arriving near Narva with an advance detachment of 12 thousand people, the Swedish king, without waiting for reinforcements and not embarrassed by a strong snowstorm, attacked the 35 thousand-strong Russian army and on November 19, 1700, completely defeated it.

Peter, upon news of the approach of the enemy, rode off to Novgorod, leaving the army under the command of General Karl von Kruey, “borrowed” by the Austrian emperor, who practically did not know the Russian language.

Probably, in the next summer campaign, Charles could have taken Moscow without much difficulty, but he decided that “barbarian” Russia no longer posed a threat, and besides, it promised little booty and glory, and rushed to Poland.

Having occupied Warsaw, he forced the Poles to convene a diet, depose Augustus the Strong and elect the Swedish protege Stanislav Leszczynski as king.

However, many lords and gentry did not recognize the decision imposed at gunpoint. With their support, Augustus and the remnants of the army began to wander around Poland. Charles persistently pursued him, dreaming of accomplishing a “feat” that few people in European history have succeeded in - capturing the king.

Image caption Boris Petrovich Sheremetev - the first Russian field marshal and holder of the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called

Historians consider Charles XII a great commander - brave, impetuous, daring, fully endowed with intuition, able to stun the enemy with unexpected moves, have a keen sense of the battlefield and inspire troops - and a very weak politician.

Peter strengthened the army and built St. Petersburg, the first Russian field marshal Boris Sheremetev took one city after another in the Baltic states, the Swedish Riksdag and the population began to grumble, and Karl continued his stubborn pursuit.

“He loved war with the passion of a medieval Norman,” a contemporary wrote about him. “He would rather get a sixteen-pound bomb in his head than make peace, even the most beneficial one for his kingdom.”

Finally, having invaded Saxony, Charles forced Augustus to sign the Peace of Altranstadt in October 1706, according to which he broke the alliance with Peter and renounced claims to the Polish crown, but even after that he lost a whole year.

March on Russia

In January 1708, Charles turned his main forces against Russia.

Everyone expected that he would move to the Baltic states to return the cities occupied by Sheremetev, but the Swedish king made, as always, an unexpected and, in the opinion of many, fatal decision: to go to Belarus, and then to Ukraine, and strike Moscow from the south.

At his disposal at that time there were only 45 thousand soldiers. In hindsight, historians, including Swedish ones, point out that when planning the campaign, the king made a lot of strategic mistakes: he attacked with insufficient forces, without ensuring communications; underestimated the enemy; did not organize reconnaissance; pinned fantastic hopes on the allies, who did not seriously think of helping.

But then all of Europe believed that “the position of the unfortunate king was becoming desperate.”

Probably, Peter also thought so, who ordered the Kremlin’s treasures to be taken out of Moscow and fortifications to be built throughout the periphery of the country. On his orders, existing churches began to be covered with earth to form an earthen mound, from within which fire could be fired. In Pskov, two such improvised forts survived almost completely intact until the beginning of the 20th century.

Mazepa

The betrayal of the Ukrainian Hetman Mazepa to Peter I is an indisputable fact. Whether he also betrayed his people is hotly debated.

Image caption Ivan Mazepa: traitor or patriot?

Ivan Stepanovich Mazepa came from a wealthy noble family, received a good education, lived in Poland and Austria, and in his youth was a great womanizer.

By the time of the Battle of Poltava he was 70 years old, of which 22 he held the post of hetman, having received it in the usual way for a Cossack elder: by telling the de facto regent of Russia, Prince Vasily Golitsyn, nasty things about his predecessor Ivan Samoilovich.

Ukrainians had enough objective reasons for dissatisfaction with Moscow. Instead of the broad autonomy promised in Pereyaslav, the tsarist government consistently brought Ukraine to the all-Russian autocratic denominator. Three of Mazepa's predecessors - Doroshenko, Mnogohreshny and Samoilovich - ended in exile.

The Cossacks were especially outraged by the Treaty of Andrusovo in 1667, under the terms of which Russia ceded Right Bank Ukraine to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and since then began to seek an alliance with Poland against the Turks and Swedes.

In fact, Moscow did not fulfill the main obligation assumed in Pereyaslav: to protect Ukraine from external enemies.

Being a prudent and cunning man, Mazepa for the time being did not show such sentiments, but did everything to be in favor with Peter and, if possible, to protect Ukraine from what some consider great reforms, and others - wild tyranny and reckless disruption of the foundations of life.

Indeed, Peter, having “raised Great Russia on its hind legs,” almost did not interfere in the internal affairs of Little Russia until Poltava. Either he didn’t get around to it, or he trusted Mazepa.

The reason for this almost limitless trust lay in the fact that Mazepa, finding himself in Moscow in 1689 at the height of the confrontation between Peter and Sophia, realized earlier than many Russian nobles which way the wind was blowing, and immediately went to the Trinity-Sergius Lavra with a bow and gifts to Peter and his mother Natalya Naryshkina.

Although Mazepa did not win major military victories, he became one of the first holders of the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called. Peter obtained for him from the Austrian Emperor the title of Prince of the Holy Roman Empire. Only Menshikov received such an honor. The news of the hetman's betrayal sounded like a bolt from the blue to the tsar.

Image caption The Battle of Poltava was depicted on a mosaic canvas by Mikhail Lomonosov

The mediator in the negotiations between Mazepa and Stanislav Leshchinsky was the hetman's godfather, Princess Anna Dolskaya. According to available data, Mazepa received the first letter from her at the end of June 1705.

The hetman's closest confidant, Filipp Orlik, in exile, recalled that Mazepa burned the first and several subsequent letters from Dolskaya, calling her “a damned crazy woman.”

Perhaps, as often happens, personal motives played a role. Having sent a corps under the command of Menshikov to help Augustus the Strong, Peter ordered Mazepa to go there with the Cossacks and be under the command of the former pie merchant. The hetman, who was old enough to be Menshikov’s father and stood head and shoulders above him in origin and education, took this as a grave insult.

Later, Mazepa learned that Menshikov was whispering “min hertsu”: the Cossacks have disbanded, they are fighting badly, he should be made hetman of Ukraine, he will be able to restore order!

Contrary to popular belief, Mazepa wanted to change Petra not in favor of Charles, but in favor of Stanislav Leszczynski, secretly agreeing with the king on the reunification of the two parts of Ukraine and its transition to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on the terms of the Gadyach Union.

The hetman hoped that the Baltic states would become the main theater of the Russian-Swedish war, and in the meantime he would slowly and without interference carry out his plans.

When Mazepa found out that Karl was going to Ukraine, his first reaction was the words: “The devil is bringing him here!”

In October 1708, Mazepa learned that Menshikov was heading to his headquarters in Baturin with troops, in whose presence he would be tied hand and foot.

Image caption “Lucky darling, rootless, semi-sovereign ruler” Menshikov received the rank of field marshal for Poltava

The hetman was faced with a choice: either abandon his plan or act immediately.

As a result, he actually fled to Charles’s headquarters, leaving a small garrison in Baturin.

Not finding Mazepa there, Menshikov besieged the city. The defenders, led by Colonel Chechel, held firm, but an unknown traitor (from the Russian point of view, a loyal subject) pointed out a secret passage into the fortress. Baturin was completely burned, the surviving defenders were executed with terrible executions. According to various sources, from six to 15 thousand people died.

According to the Ukrainian writer and historian Bohdan Lepky, prisoners were tortured with a hot iron in the presence of Menshikov, trying to find out where the hetman's treasury and signs of power were located.

Since the Cossack regiments were by that time attached to the Russian army and were located in different places, Mazepa managed to bring with him only five thousand people instead of 30-40 thousand. Subsequently, about the same number of Cossacks joined them, but most of the Cossacks, frightened by the reprisal against the Baturynites, took a wait-and-see attitude. Mazepa’s supporters did not participate in the Battle of Poltava on the side of the Swedes.

Poltava battle

In April 1709, the Swedes besieged Poltava. If the city was captured, a threat was created to Voronezh, a key base for supplying and forming the Russian army.

At the end of May, Peter arrived with the main forces near Poltava. The Swedes had only to accept the battle: they had a city in front of them, and the Russian army behind them. However, Karl himself had long sought to give a “general battle.”

Image caption Poltava triumphant

On June 21-22, the Swedes launched their last unsuccessful assault on Poltava, spending almost all their gun ammunition.

At 6 am on June 29 (July 8, new style), Peter lined up his troops and addressed them with the famous speech: “Soldiers! The hour has come that will decide the fate of the Fatherland. And so you should not think that you are fighting for Peter, but for the state, handed to Peter. And about Peter, know that life is not precious to Peter, if only Russia, its honor, glory and prosperity would live!”

At 9 am, Karl gave the signal to attack. The battle lasted only two hours.

Peter and his generals built the earthen fortifications extremely competently. In addition to the six redoubts on the main line of defense, four more were built, located in the center perpendicular to the main ones. Thus, the advancing Swedish army was immediately cut in two, found itself under fire from close range and suffered heavy losses. The right-flank columns of generals Ross and Schlippenbach were cut off from the main forces and were destroyed by Menshikov's dragoons.

The Tsar also applied another innovation in military affairs: as far as one can judge, for the first time in history and 250 years before Stalin, he placed barrage detachments in the rear of his army with the order to shoot at those running. But this was not necessary.

At the beginning of the battle, the Swedes managed to push back the Russian center. Then Peter personally led the second battalion of the Novgorod infantry regiment into a counterattack. At the same time, a Swedish bullet pierced his hat.

Image caption The king and hetman barely managed to cross the Dnieper

The Swedes attacked on the left flank, trying to bypass the Russian fortifications along the edge of the Budishchensky forest, but Menshikov’s dragoons arrived in time, “they fought with broadswords and, having driven into the enemy line, took 14 standards and banners.”

When the Russian dragoons began to bypass the flanks of the royal army, Peter gave the signal for a general attack. The Swedes could not withstand the bayonet strike and fled. About 12 thousand soldiers left in reserve by Charles never had time to enter the battle.

Peter sent the same Menshikov in pursuit, who the next day overtook the enemy at Perevolochna, where the Swedes wanted to cross to the right bank of the Dnieper. Lacking boats and rafts, 16,947 soldiers and officers, led by General Levengaupt, surrendered. Karl and Mazepa with a handful of people managed to escape to Turkey.

The losses of the Russian army near Poltava amounted to 1,345 killed and 3,290 wounded. The Swedes lost 9,234 people killed and 18,794 prisoners (including those captured at Perevolochna). The flower of the Swedish generals and the Prime Minister Count Pieper, who accompanied Karl on the campaign, were captured. The winners received 28 cannons, 127 banners and standards, and the royal treasury.

The story is widely known about how Peter threw a banquet in the evening after the battle, invited captured Swedish military leaders to it and, pouring them vodka with his own hands, proposed a toast “To the health of our teachers!”, to which Field Marshal Renschild replied: “Well, you paid us for science!"

True, after this knightly gesture, the generals were sent to remote northern cities, where they suffered severe hardships until the end of the war. 40 thousand captured Swedes of a lower rank (of course, taken not only near Poltava, but throughout the war) were sent to the construction of St. Petersburg, where most of them laid down their heads.

Conflicting assessments

“It would be a shame to lose Poltava […] The Russian army destroyed the emaciated, worn-out, demoralized Swedes, who were dragged here by a 27-year-old Scandinavian tramp,” wrote Vasily Klyuchevsky.

Modern Russian researcher Alexander Bushkov generally believes that “the Battle of Poltava, which we were taught from childhood to consider something incredibly grandiose and epoch-making, was almost an ordinary skirmish.”

Image caption The personal standard of Charles XII is kept in the Peter and Paul Fortress

Indeed, the Swedes fought thousands of miles from their country, with virtually no connection with their homeland, reinforcements or supplies. The soldiers and officers did not know what they were fighting for, and most of them were tired of talking about glory.

On the Swedish side, 16 thousand people took part in the Battle of Poltava with 41 guns, of which only four were fired due to lack of ammunition. From the Russian side - 37 thousand people and 72 (according to other sources 112) artillery barrels. The total strength of Peter's army, taking into account the reserve and the garrison of Poltava, was about 60 thousand.

Shortly before the battle, Karl was wounded in the leg and commanded from a stretcher (by the way, it was smashed by a cannonball, so he miraculously escaped death). Heroic battle paintings depicting the king energetically gesticulating in a reclining position later hung in many aristocratic houses in Europe, but this, of course, did not contribute to the successful leadership of the troops.

On the other hand, given the hitherto unquestioned authority of the Swedish army and its commander, Poltava was a huge moral victory.

Eight and a half years after the Narva defeat, the Russians met for the first time with the main Swedish forces under the command of the king.

Military experts almost unanimously believe that Peter’s army prevailed not only in numbers, but also in skill. The infantry, cavalry and artillery demonstrated excellent coordination and training. The dragoon regiments particularly distinguished themselves. The triangular baguette bayonet introduced by Peter justified itself, becoming the main symbol of Russian military power for two centuries.

Parterre and stage

The Northern War continued for another 12 years.

Instead of taking advantage of Charles’s absence in Sweden and quickly achieving a profitable and honorable peace by striking through Finland or landing troops near Stockholm, Peter first launched the Prut campaign, which ended in disaster, and then, according to Klyuchevsky, “was drawn into court squabbles and petty dynastic interests of the German world" and "exchanged the main task for Mecklenburg, Saxon and Danish trifles."

Image caption The path traveled by the Swedish army since the beginning of the war ended near Poltava

As the French historian Georges Udard later wrote, the Russian Tsar “had the misfortune of getting involved in a chaos of complex intrigues that required subtle political instincts, sophisticated diplomacy and financial resources, which he lacked.”

However, all this could not change the main thing: the fate of the war, Russia and Sweden was decided at Poltava finally and irrevocably.

According to the Swedish historian Peter Englund, "the Swedes left the stage of world history and took their seats in the auditorium." Russia came to the forefront, becoming one of the key factors in European and later world politics.

Who won and who lost as a result depends on the understanding of happiness and the meaning of life.

In any case, Englund seems to have no doubt about the answer to this question. According to him, “one of the roads leading to the current prosperity of Sweden originated near Poltava.”

Having been forced to abandon expansionist policies and claims to the role of a great power, Sweden has never fought with anyone since 1809 and has become a cozy, safe country, whose residents enjoy the broadest political and social rights and a high standard of living.

Russia has become a military-bureaucratic empire, the best symbol of which, according to the French Marquis de Custine, who visited the country in the middle of the last century, could be brilliant cavalry regiments galloping past poor villages, and for 250 years it has not missed a single more or less significant war , having lost millions of their sons on them.

What would happen if?

Recently, both in Russia and in the West, the genre of “virtual history” has become fashionable: what would the world be like if Bradbury’s hero had not stepped on a butterfly, if at one or another fork in the road events had moved in a different direction?

Obviously, all subsequent history would have looked completely different if Charles XII had won at Poltava.

Image caption There is a church on the site of the Battle of Poltava

Sweden would have finally turned Poland into its vassal, would have established itself in northern Germany, would have turned the Baltic into its internal lake, would have become, along with Britain, France and Austria, one of the key European players for a long time, and with a high degree of probability would have taken the path of colonialism. expansion.

With such virtuality, the rise of Prussia would have been impossible, and therefore there would have been no Germany in its current form.

Ukraine would have every chance to prosper as a semi-independent subject of the Polish-Lithuanian-Little Russian confederation, which, in turn, is a protectorate of the Swedish Empire, and already in the 18th century to become a European country.

However, a pessimistic option was also possible: with a new round of struggle for power between the Cossack elders after the death of old Mazepa, or an uprising of the serfs, to whom Mazepa did not promise anything, with the support of sympathetic Cossacks.

In this case, Ukraine would have faced either many years of bloody chaos, or the suppression of unrest by the Swedes or Turks with subsequent occupation.

It is absolutely impossible to imagine Russia occupied by Swedish garrisons and controlled from Stockholm. However, it would undoubtedly face relegation to a minor Asian country.

St. Petersburg would have become a Swedish city, or it would have been completely abandoned. The window to Europe that Peter began to cut would have been boarded up. Peter himself, most likely, would have been overthrown from the throne either by the Swedes or by his own subjects. The minor Alexei Petrovich would have ascended the throne, which would not have contributed to strong politics.

In the case of an optimistic scenario, a generation or two later a new reformer would appear who would start all over again, and perhaps do better than Peter.

In another virtuality, Russia would remain in the state of Persia or China for a long time.

With this version of history, it would not have had many things: sovereign greatness and “noble nests,” Kunersdorf and Borodin, the voyages of Krusenstern and Bellingshausen, Pushkin and the Hermitage, Mendeleev and Pirogov.

But there wouldn’t have been many bad things: the murder of his son by his own father in 1718, extreme forms of serfdom, 25-year soldiering, the tragic split of the nation into “Russian Europeans” and “Russian Asians,” and most importantly, endless wars. And the Bolshevik experiment, most likely, would not have happened either.

Russia would live less brilliantly and interestingly, but more simply and, probably, happier.

There is no point in being happy or sad about this. History on the field near Poltava turned out the way it did.

History of mankind. Russia Khoroshevsky Andrey Yurievich

Battle of Poltava (1709)

Battle of Poltava (1709)

Russian troops under the command of Peter I and A.D. Menshikov defeated the famous Swedish army led by Charles XII. Thus, the Swedes’ plans to capture Moscow were thwarted; the battle became a turning point in the course of the Northern War between Russia and Sweden.

At the beginning of the 17th century, taking advantage of the weakening of Russia, Sweden captured the Russian cities of Ivangorod, Yam, Koporye and Oreshek. So Russia refused to be cut off from the sea coast and stopped foreign trade through the Baltic ports. At the turn of the XVII–XVIII centuries. Peter I decided to “open a window to Europe” and return access to the Baltic Sea to the Russians. In this struggle, he encountered a talented commander, the grandson of Gustav Adolf, King Charles XII. In 1700, at the start of the so-called Northern War with Russia, the king was only 18 years old, Peter was 28.

The 140,000-strong Swedish army was considered one of the best in Europe at that time; the Swedish fleet, numbering 42 battleships and 12 frigates, also had great power. In Russia, the first steps to reorganize the army were just being taken. The beginning of the war was unsuccessful for Russia; its troops were defeated near Narva in the fall of 1700.

But the development of the military industry and active efforts to strengthen the army continued. The production of rifles with a bayonet began, and great attention was paid to artillery. Only for 1700–1708. 1006 guns, mortars and howitzers were cast in Russia. From 1703, regular recruitment of peasants and townspeople (mainly artisans) began to take place; the officer corps was formed from nobles who necessarily served as soldiers in the guard. In 1708–1709 All branches of the military received a uniform military uniform.

After the victory at Narva, Charles XII directed the main blow against Poland, which in 1704 became an ally of Russia. Taking advantage of the absence of Sweden's main forces in the Baltic states, Russian regiments under the command of B.P. Sheremetev in 1701–1702. defeated the Swedes at Erestfer and at Gummelsgof. As a result of the siege and assault, the Russians took the Noteburg (Oreshek) fortress. This victory opened the way to capturing the mouth of the Neva. On May 16, 1703, the Peter and Paul Fortress was founded, marking the beginning of St. Petersburg.

In 1704, Russian troops captured Narva and Dorpat (Tartu). Russia regained the coast of the Neva and firmly established itself in the Eastern Baltic.

The theater of military operations was shifting to the south. Charles XII chose a different strategic direction. In Poland, the Swedes managed to take Warsaw and Krakow, and obtained from the Sejm the deprivation of Augustus II of the Polish crown. A supporter of the Swedish king, Stanislav Leszczynski, was placed on the throne. In connection with these events, Peter I convened a military council in Zholkva (Galicia), at which the possibility of a general battle with the Swedes was discussed not in Poland, but on Russian territory. To do this it was necessary to exhaust the enemy forces. Already at the beginning of 1707, the Russian command became aware that the attack of the main enemy forces would be directed through Belarus and Smolensk to Moscow. Charles XII wanted to dismember the Russian state. Its northern territories were to go to Sweden; the king was going to plant his protege in Moscow. He promised Ukraine, Smolensk region and other western territories to Poland.

Peter I considered an untimely general battle as an “extremely dangerous matter” and was ready to give it only after careful preparation. Gaining time, Russian troops launched separate attacks on the enemy, delaying him on the water lines.

Having entered Mogilev on July 8, 1708, Charles XII was awaiting the approach of Leven-Haupt's sixteen-thousand-strong corps, which was traveling from Riga with a large convoy to join the main forces. Without waiting for reinforcements and experiencing an urgent need for food and fodder, the Swedes crossed to the left bank of the Dnieper and moved to Smolensk. In a battle near the village of Dobroye, their vanguard numbering over five thousand people was defeated. Charles XII abandoned the campaign through Smolensk and turned to Ukraine, taking advantage of the invitation of Hetman Mazepa.

68-year-old Mazepa was an experienced and deft diplomat and politician. He carried out special assignments under the Polish king, hetmans Doroshenko and Samoilovich, gained confidence in the temporary worker Vasily Golitsyn and in 1687 received the hetman's mace. Peter I, who brutally dealt with Golitsyn’s henchmen, did not touch the Ukrainian hetman. Moreover, Mazepa managed to win over the formidable king. During the Northern War, Peter continued to trust the hetman completely and allowed him to occupy Right Bank Ukraine when the Swedes invaded Poland. Thus, both banks of the Dnieper came under the rule of Mazepa.

Even in the first years of the Northern War, Ivan Stepanovich conducted secret negotiations with Karl, and then with Stanislav Leshchinsky. He promised to provide them with winter quarters, food and a Cossack army of fifty thousand during the Swedish invasion. Most likely, Mazepa wanted to strengthen his own power, unite significant territories under his mace and have a certain independence in governance from the Swedes and Poles. However, the negotiations were conducted extremely carefully: Mazepa was waiting to see which side would have the advantage. But when the Swedish king turned south, he had to openly go over to the side of Russia’s opponents. On October 24, 1708, with a total of five thousand (according to other sources - two thousand) detachment and part of the faithful foreman, Mazepa crossed the Desna and went to join Karl, hoping for the support of the entire Cossacks and motivating his transition by an uprising against Moscow oppression.

When Charles invaded Ukraine in September, the main forces of the Russian army under the command of B.P. Sheremetev also turned south, and Peter I and A.D. Menshikov, having formed a light mobile detachment of twelve thousand, moved towards Levenhaupt’s corps. On September 28, Russian troops forced Levengaupt to take battle in a difficult wooded and swampy area near the village of Lesnoy. The Swedes lost 8,700 people killed, 45 officers and more than 700 soldiers were captured. The entire convoy with a large amount of ammunition and food, 17 guns, 44 banners went to the Russians. Peter I called the victory at Lesnaya “the mother of the Poltava battle.”

Menshikov, who was located near the Ukrainian border, quickly responded to Mazepa’s transition to the enemy’s side. He blocked the crossing of the Desna and issued a manifesto to the Ukrainian people on October 28, in which he branded the hetman as a traitor to his homeland and faith, who wanted to give the Orthodox faith to the Uniates. On November 2, Menshikov entered Baturin and staged a pogrom there, destroying a significant part of the population, and four days later in Glukhov, I. Skoropadsky was elected hetman in place of the deposed Mazepa. However, even without the repressive measures of the Russian command, the Ukrainian population was in no hurry to go over to the Swedish side.

In the spring, Peter I sent Yakovlev’s detachment to suppress a possible uprising by the Sich. The tsarist troops broke into the Sich and, after a short battle, forced the Cossacks to capitulate. 300 people surrendered. Yakovlev ordered the noble captives to be sent to the tsar, and executed the rest on the spot as traitors. By royal order, the Zaporozhye Sich was destroyed and burned.

The capture of Baturin by the Russians was the second serious blow for the Swedes after Lesnaya. Charles XII hoped to replenish supplies of food, gunpowder, and cannonballs at the hetman’s residence, and to take the artillery located there.

The advance of the Swedish army across Ukraine was not without problems. Romny, Gadyach, Chernukhi, Piryatin, Zenkov and other cities offered stubborn resistance to Karl. The Swedes were also alarmed by numerous small detachments of Cossacks and local residents operating in the rear of the advancing army.

Swedish troops launched an invasion of Slobozhanshchina. And here they were not welcomed with open arms. Kotelva, Krasnokutsk, and Kolomak defended stubbornly. Small Russian detachments and the Cossack regiment of Galagan successfully acted against the Swedes. Swedish troops were forced to retreat to the area between the Vorskla and Psla rivers. At this time, Russian troops and Cossacks carried out a strategic encirclement of the enemy in Left Bank Ukraine. Cossack regiments controlled crossings across the Dnieper. Peter I repeatedly offered Charles XII to make peace, but he declared that he would end the war by entering Moscow.

To improve the supply of his troops, the Swedish monarch decided to occupy Poltava. This would also help him obtain convenient routes for communication with Turkey and the Crimean Khanate, and use the crossing of the Dnieper at Perevolochnaya to replenish the army with the detachment of General Krassou and the Polish gentry. Poltava was located on the right, high bank of the Vorskla. Its fortifications, as it seemed to the Swedish generals, could not be a serious obstacle. The army of Charles XII had experience of sieging more powerful fortresses in the Baltic states, Poland, and Saxony.

Given the important strategic position of the city, the Russian command sent six infantry battalions to Poltava under the command of Colonel A.S. Kelin. The Poltava garrison consisted of 4,181 soldiers and officers, 91 gunners and 2,600 armed local residents; there were 28 cannons in the city.

On April 3, 1709, a 1,500-strong Swedish detachment appeared in front of the fortifications and began to storm them. The attack was repulsed. In the following days there were forays from both sides. On April 5, the Swedes lost 427 people killed, the Poltava garrison - 62. The forays of the city’s defenders did not give the Swedes the opportunity to build trenches near the ramparts. In response to the tunnels where mines were laid, Kelin ordered trenches to be dug from the city. Poltava residents were given the opportunity to seize the gunpowder they were putting in. The assaults on April 29 and 30 failed.

On May 14, Menshikov brought his troops to the left bank of the Vorskla opposite the city. At dawn on May 15, about 1,200 soldiers dressed in Swedish uniforms under the command of Alexei Golovin crossed Vorskla. At the fortress itself, they burst into enemy trenches and killed 200 soldiers, then the detachment managed to break into the city.

Charles XII understood that large Russian forces were concentrating near Poltava, but he categorically refused to leave, expecting support from Leshchinsky and Krassou. Capturing Poltava became a matter of prestige for him. On May 23, laying mines under the ramparts, three thousand Swedes rushed to attack. The besieged managed to defuse the mines, and the attack of Charles’s detachment was repulsed.

On the evening of June 1, Poltava was shelled with incendiary bombs. While the fire was being put out in the city, the Swedes burst onto the ramparts, but were again overpowered and driven back.

On June 2, Field Marshal Renschild presented Commandant Kelin with an ultimatum to surrender on honorable terms. Otherwise, he threatened the complete extermination of the garrison and residents of the city. Kelin, without hesitation, rejected the demands, stating that he already had seven such letters.

On June 4, near Poltava, in the village of Krutoy Bereg, Peter I arrived. This was reported to the defenders of the city in a letter enclosed in a discharged cannonball. On June 16, the Russian military council came to the conclusion that the only way to prevent the fall of Poltava was a general battle. Preparations for it included the transfer of the main forces of the Russian army to the right bank of the Vorskla. At the same time, the Cossacks were ordered to occupy all the withdrawal routes of the Swedish troops through Psel and further to Poland.

The Swedish army found itself in a dead end. There was not enough strength for the offensive, but retreat was also associated with great risk. During a reconnaissance on June 17, Charles XII was wounded in the leg, and rumors spread throughout his army that the king was deliberately seeking death. “Northern Alexander the Great” understood that the Russian army was preparing for a general battle and saw the capture of Poltava as the only way to protect itself from the rear. The assaults followed one after another. The city experienced difficult days on June 21 and 22, when the Swedes were especially persistent and lost over two thousand people. During the defense, the defenders of Poltava lost 1,186 soldiers killed, 1,200 people were wounded, while Karl was left without more than six thousand soldiers - i.e., a fifth of the army that came to Ukraine. His hopes of receiving support were not justified: the corps of Lieutenant General Goltz provided the appearance in Ukraine of troops of the Polish gentry and the Swedish corps of Krassow.

On June 19, the main forces of the Russian army crossed Vorskla with three fords (the remaining units crossed on the night of June 20) and settled on a wide open plain near the village of Semenovka. A camp was built here. However, such terrain was convenient for linear formation and would give great advantages to the strong Swedish cavalry. On June 25, after inspecting the camp, Peter ordered the army to be transferred closer to Poltava and stationed near the village of Yakovtsy. Hollows, ravines and small forests excluded the possibility of wide cavalry maneuver. Here infantry was needed, which constituted the main strength of the Russian army.

In one night, a camp was built, protected on one side by the steep bank of the Vorskla, on the other by the Yakovets forest, and on the third by a small ravine. The fortifications consisted of earthen ramparts and redans in the form of a protruding corner. There were significant gaps between the ramparts and redans so that the army could not only defend itself, but also quickly go on the offensive. In front of the camp stretched a small flat field, about one and a half kilometers wide and up to three kilometers long. From the east it adjoined the Yakovetsky forest, from the west - to the Malobudyshchansky forest. From the direction of Poltava lay the only possible path of advance of the Swedish army. On this part of the field, by order of Peter I, a forward position was created: six transverse (relative to the direction of the Swedish offensive) and four longitudinal redoubts were built. (By the way, similar fortifications did not appear on the battlefields of Europe any time soon.) Rifle and artillery fire from the redoubts was supposed to dismember the linear order of enemy regiments.

The Russian command took into account that Charles XII usually sought to strike the first blow with maximum forces. Infantry and artillery, concentrated in redoubts, repelled the first onslaught and forced the Swedes to split up their forces.

All Russian regiments on June 26 occupied the positions provided for in the battle plan. The infantry of the Belgorod regiment with artillery were stationed in the redoubts. Behind the redoubts the cavalry was located under the command of Menshikov and Bour, consisting of 17 dragoon regiments.

Poltava victory. Hood. A. Kotzebue

On the night of June 26-27, a non-commissioned officer of the Semenovsky regiment ran over from the Russian camp to the Swedes, who reported on the Russian preparations for battle and the location of the troops. He apparently also said that the Swedes could be successful in attacking Apraksin’s regiment, which consisted of recruits dressed in gray uniforms. Peter, having learned about the defector, ordered changes in the disposition of the regiments, and Apraksin’s soldiers exchanged uniforms with the proven Novgorod infantry regiment. The main forces of the Cossack cavalry concentrated near the village of Zhuki in order to close the direct path for the enemy’s retreat. On the eve of the battle, Peter I toured the troops and delivered short patriotic addresses, in which he called on them to fight not for Peter, but “for Russia and Russian piety.” Charles XII was also carried on a stretcher in front of the Swedish regiments, who promised that tomorrow his soldiers would dine in the Russian convoy.

The number of Russian troops near Poltava was 42 thousand, Swedish - about 30 thousand. Karl left part of his forces to guard the trenches and the siege camp under the city, the convoy and the road along the Vorskla to the Dnieper.

On June 27, before dawn, Swedish infantry and cavalry moved towards the location of the Russian troops. Menshikov led the cavalry to the forward redoubts and started a counter battle.

Unexpectedly, the Swedish command encountered a Russian advanced position at the redoubts. The artillery opened fire at the maximum distance, which already deprived the enemy of an important advantage - surprise of the strike. The Swedes initially managed to somewhat push back the Russian cavalry and occupy the two nearest unfinished redoubts. However, they were unable to cross the transverse redoubts. The crossfire of Russian infantry and artillery from the redoubts and cavalry attacks repulsed the enemy's onslaught. The Russian cavalry pressed the Swedish cavalry towards the Yakovets Forest.

Having received a report that part of the troops of Schlippenbach and Ross, who were leaving for the Yakovetsky Forest, had been cut off, Peter sent Menshikov five infantry battalions and five dragoon regiments. At the same time, the Russian cavalry, led by Bour, was ordered to withdraw from the redoubts. Bour's withdrawal was perceived by the Swedes as forced. Carried away by the pursuit, the Swedish cavalry and infantry found themselves in a clearing a hundred paces from the Russian camp. The Russian artillery, commanded by J. Bruce, opened fire. Hit by buckshot and cannonballs, the enemy rushed to the left, to the edge of the Malobudyshchansky forest. The generals and officers of Charles XII began to put the thinned regiments in order. Only now has it become known about the absence of the columns of Ross and Schlippenbach, which made up a fourth of the Swedish army. They were completely defeated by the Russians at the Yakovets forest. The first stage of the battle ended at six o'clock in the morning. Three hours of inactivity of the Swedish troops ensued. The respite meant that the Swedes lost the initiative.

After some time, Russian intelligence reported that the Swedes were forming a battle formation near the Malobudyshchansky forest. Now the main role was to be played by the Russian infantry. Peter I ordered the withdrawal of the regiments. Six infantry regiments remained in the camp so that the Swedes would not see the numerical superiority of the Russians and retreat without a fight. Russian regiments lined up in front of the camp. The infantry lined up in two lines: in front were the first battalions of each regiment, followed by the second. This ensured mutual support, the necessary depth of battle formation, as well as a certain independence of the regiments' actions. There were 10 thousand people in the first line. The artillery was dispersed along the entire infantry front. On the left flank there were six selected dragoon regiments under the command of Menshikov, on the right – eleven led by Bour. Three infantry battalions were sent to communicate with the Poltava garrison, and six dragoon regiments were sent to the village of Zhuki to help the Cossacks pursue the enemy.

Sheremetev was appointed commander of all troops, Peter himself took over leadership of the center division. Before the start of the battle, the king addressed the soldiers with the famous call: “Warriors! The hour has come that will decide the fate of the fatherland. So, you should not think that you are fighting for Peter, but for the state entrusted to Peter, for your family, for your fatherland ... "

The battle formation of the Swedish troops corresponded in form to the formation of the Russian regiments. But the infantry was placed in one line in order to stretch the front and hide the heavy losses suffered in the first stage of the battle. The second line contained only three infantry battalions. The cavalry was placed in two lines and evenly distributed on the flanks, four guns were placed along the front. In this order of battle, the Swedes began to approach the Russians.

When approaching a rifle shot, both sides fired a strong volley from all types of weapons. Russian artillery fire disrupted the enemy ranks, and then came the moment of brutal hand-to-hand combat. Two Swedish battalions, closing the front, rushed at the first battalion of the Novgorod regiment, which stood out with its homespuns. To their surprise, the “recruits” were not at a loss. But with a bayonet attack, the Swedes still managed to crush and push back the first battalion. Peter himself led the second battalion into the attack. The Novgorodians rushed in with fixed bayonets and restored the line. The powerful figure of Peter attracted enemy shooters: one bullet pierced his hat, the second - his saddle.

Excellent Russian artillery played a huge role. The second stage of the battle lasted from 9 to 11 o'clock. In the first half hour, cannon and rifle fire caused enormous damage to the Swedes. Charles's elite regiments lost more than half of their strength and almost all their officers. During the battle, a cannonball hit the royal stretcher, and a rumor spread among the soldiers that Charles had died. Field Marshal Renschild intensified the panic by shouting: “Your Majesty, our infantry is dead!”

The Swedish onslaught weakened. Having attacked the enemy’s right flank, Menshikov pushed back the enemy cavalry, exposed the infantry and put it in danger of destruction. The Swedes' right flank wavered and began to retreat. Menshikov's local success soon grew into a Russian offensive along the entire front. The Swedes fled. The remnants of the once invincible army poured through the Malobudyshchansky forest. Subsequently, they encountered the Skoropadsky Cossacks and turned towards Kobelyaki to reach the Dnieper at Perevolochnaya.

In the battle of Poltava, Charles XII lost 9324 soldiers; 2874 soldiers and officers led by Renschild surrendered. The Russian army had 1345 killed and 3290 wounded. On June 28, the ceremonial entry of the winners into Poltava took place. Ten dragoon, Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky guards regiments under the overall command of Menshikov pursued the Swedish army. The Cossacks of Colonel Paliya took part in the pursuit of the enemy. The pursuit continued to the Dnieper. At Perevolochnaya, the Swedes did not find means of crossing - they were destroyed in advance by Yakovlev’s detachment. Only Karl with a guard detachment of a thousand people and Mazepa with several hundred Cossacks managed to cross the Dnieper. Menshikov’s detachment that arrived in time was inferior in number to the Swedish army left in Perevolochnaya. Menshikov ordered the dragoons to dismount and join the infantry, and the horse handlers positioned the horses so that the enemy would mistake them for combat cavalry. A demonstrative offensive was launched from several sides. Seeing no other way out, 11 infantry and 11 dragoon regiments (16,264 people) under the command of Levengaupt capitulated on June 30. 174 banners, 28 guns, many small arms, a convoy, and the treasury of the Swedes fell into the hands of the Russians.

The Battle of Poltava became a turning point in the Northern War and, in the words of Peter I, “laid the foundation stone of St. Petersburg,” that is, the foundation of the powerful Russian Empire.

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Battle of Poltava 1709 date Date and place (27 rubles) 1709 r., area of ​​the villages of Zhuki – Yakivtsi – Pavlenki – Semenivka on the outskirts of Poltava (nine partly on the territory of the city of Poltava, regional center of Ukraine ).The Russian army was actually defeated by Tsar Petro I . Formal

After the Polish battles, the Swedish army was severely exhausted, and therefore retreated to Ukraine to replenish its strength. Peter I understood that the Swedes were a dangerous enemy. Therefore, everything was done to prevent the enemy from getting the necessary rest - along the route of the Swedish troops, all supplies of food and weapons were destroyed, ordinary people went into the forest, hiding food and livestock there.

The Battle of Poltava briefly. Progress of the battle.

Before the battle begins.

In the autumn of 1708, the Swedes reached the suburbs of Poltava and, settling down for the winter rest in Budishchi, decided to take the city by storm. The superiority of forces was significant - the Swedish king Charles XII had thirty thousand soldiers at his disposal against the small Poltava garrison.

But the courage of the city residents allowed them to hold out against an entire army for two months. Poltava was never surrendered to the Swedes.

Battle of Poltava. Preparing for battle.

While the Swedes were losing time and energy under the walls of Poltava, Peter I was preparing his troops for the most important battle. At the beginning of June, having crossed the Vorskla River, Russian soldiers settled down at Yakovtsy, five kilometers from the besieged city, in the rear of the Swedes.

Having blocked the only path along which the Swedes could advance with several redoubts, behind them Peter placed 17 cavalry regiments of his friend and military leader, Alexander Menshikov.

Ukrainian Hetman Skoropadsky, meanwhile, cut off the Swedes’ path to Poland and Ukraine. Peter did not trust the hetman too much, but nevertheless used his powers.

Battle of Poltava with the Swedes. Battle.

The Battle of Poltava began on the morning of June 27, 1709. At first it might seem that the advantage was on the side of the Swedes - although they lost many soldiers, they were still able to get through two lines of fortifications. However, under artillery fire they had no choice but to retreat into the forest and take a break.

Taking advantage of the pause, Peter moved the main forces to the position. And in the next “round” of the battle, the Swedes began to openly lose. The Novgorod regiment, brought into battle on time, caused confusion in the Swedish formation, and Menshikov's cavalry struck from the other side.

In this chaos, the Swedes could not stand it and fled. By 11 o'clock in the morning the battle was over. King Charles XII and his ally, the traitor hetman Mazepa, managed to escape by crossing the Dnieper, but 15 thousand Swedish soldiers and commanders were captured.

The meaning and results of the Battle of Poltava.

After the battle given to the Swedish king by Peter I, this country ceased to be the most powerful military force in Europe. The Swedes lost a third of their troops killed and lost key commanders who were captured.

All participants in the Battle of Poltava became heroes at the hands of Peter, and the Northern War ended in victory for Russia.

Battle of Poltava
	Near Poltava, Ukraine
	Decisive victory for the Russian army
Opponents
Commanders
Carl Gustav Rehnschild	Alexander Danilovich Menshikov
Strengths of the parties
General forces: 26,000 Swedes (about 11,000 cavalry and 15,000 infantry), 1,000 Wallachian hussars, 41 guns, about 2 thousand Cossacks Total: about 37,000 Forces in battle: 8270 infantry, 7800 dragoons and reiters, 1000 hussars, 4 guns Did not take part in the battle: Cossacks	General forces: about 37,000 infantry (87 battalions), 23,700 cavalry (27 regiments and 5 squadrons), 102 guns Total: about 60,000 Forces in battle: 25,000 infantry, 9,000 dragoons, Cossacks and Kalmyks, another 3,000 Kalmyks came to the end of the battle Poltava garrison: 4200 infantry, 2000 Cossacks, 28 guns

Battle of Poltava- the largest battle of the Northern War between Russian troops under the command of Peter I and the Swedish army of Charles XII. It took place on the morning of June 27 (July 8), 1709, 6 versts from the city of Poltava on Ukrainian lands (Left Bank of the Dnieper). The decisive victory of the Russian army led to a turning point in the Northern War in Russia's favor and ended Sweden's dominance as the main military power in Europe.

After the Battle of Narva in 1700, Charles XII invaded Europe and a long war broke out involving many states, in which the army of Charles XII was able to advance far to the south, gaining victories.

After Peter I conquered part of Livonia from Charles XII and founded a new fortified city of St. Petersburg at the mouth of the Neva, Charles decided to attack central Russia and capture Moscow. During the campaign, he decided to lead his army to Little Russia, whose hetman, Mazepa, went over to Karl’s side, but was not supported by the bulk of the Cossacks. By the time Charles’s army approached Poltava, he had lost up to a third of the army, his rear was attacked by Peter’s light cavalry - Cossacks and Kalmyks, and was wounded just before the battle. The battle was lost by Charles, and he fled to the Ottoman Empire.

Background

In October 1708, Peter I became aware of the betrayal and defection of Hetman Mazepa to the side of Charles XII, who negotiated with the king for quite a long time, promising him, if he arrived in Ukraine, up to 50 thousand Cossack troops, food and comfortable wintering. On October 28, 1708, Mazepa, at the head of a detachment of Cossacks, arrived at Charles’s headquarters. It was in this year that Peter I amnestied and recalled from exile (accused of treason based on Mazepa’s slander) the Ukrainian colonel Paliy Semyon (real name Gurko); Thus, the sovereign of Russia secured the support of the Cossacks.

From the many thousands of Ukrainian Cossacks (registered Cossacks numbered 30 thousand, Zaporozhye Cossacks - 10-12 thousand), Mazepa managed to bring only up to 10 thousand people, about 3 thousand registered Cossacks and about 7 thousand Cossacks. But they soon began to flee from the camp of the Swedish army. King Charles XII was afraid to use such unreliable allies, of which there were about 2 thousand, in battle, and therefore left them in the baggage train.

In the spring of 1709, Charles XII, being with his army on Russian territory, decided to resume the attack on Moscow through Kharkov and Belgorod. The strength of his army decreased significantly and amounted to 35 thousand people. In an effort to create favorable preconditions for an offensive, Karl decides to quickly capture Poltava, located on the right bank of the Vorskla.

On April 30, Swedish troops began the siege of Poltava. Under the leadership of Colonel A. S. Kelin, its garrison of 4.2 thousand soldiers (Tver and Ustyug soldier regiments and one battalion each from three more regiments - Perm, Apraksin and Fechtenheim), 2 thousand Cossacks of the Poltava Cossack Regiment (Colonel Ivan Levenets) and 2.6 thousand armed townspeople successfully repelled a number of assaults. From April to June, the Swedes launched 20 assaults on Poltava and lost more than 6 thousand people under its walls. At the end of May, the main forces of the Russian army, led by Peter, approached Poltava. They were located on the left bank of the Vorskla River opposite from Poltava. After Peter decided on a general battle at the military council on June 16, on the same day the advanced detachment of Russians crossed the Vorskla north of Poltava, near the village of Petrovka, ensuring the possibility of crossing the entire army.

On June 19, the main forces of the Russian troops marched to the crossing and crossed Vorskla the next day. Peter I camped his army near the village of Semyonovka. On June 25, the Russian army redeployed even further south, taking up a position 5 kilometers from Poltava, near the village of Yakovtsy. The total strength of the two armies was impressive: the Russian army consisted of 60 thousand soldiers and 102 artillery pieces. Charles XII had up to 37 thousand soldiers (including up to ten thousand Zaporozhye and Ukrainian Cossacks of Hetman Mazepa) and 41 guns (30 cannons, 2 howitzers, 8 mortars and 1 shotgun). A smaller number of troops took part directly in the Battle of Poltava. On the Swedish side there were about 8,000 infantry (18 battalions), 7,800 cavalry and about 1,000 irregular cavalry, and on the Russian side - about 25,000 infantry, some of whom, even being present on the field, did not take part in the battle. In addition, on the Russian side, cavalry units numbering 9,000 soldiers and Cossacks (including Ukrainians loyal to Peter) took part in the battle. On the Russian side, 73 artillery pieces were involved in the battle against 4 Swedish ones. The charges for the Swedish artillery were almost completely used up during the siege of Poltava.

On June 26, the Russians began to build a forward position. Ten redoubts were erected, which were occupied by two battalions of the Belgorod infantry regiment of Colonel Savva Aigustov under the command of Lieutenant Colonels Neklyudov and Nechaev. Behind the redoubts there were 17 cavalry regiments under the command of A.D. Menshikov.

Charles XII, having received information about the imminent approach of a large Kalmyk detachment to the Russians, decided to attack Peter’s army before the Kalmyks completely disrupted his communications. Wounded during a reconnaissance on June 17, the king transferred command to Field Marshal K. G. Renschild, who received 20 thousand soldiers at his disposal. About 10 thousand people, including Mazepa’s Cossacks, remained in the camp near Poltava.

On the eve of the battle, Peter I toured all the regiments. His short patriotic appeals to soldiers and officers formed the basis of the famous order, which demanded that soldiers fight not for Peter, but for “Russia and Russian piety...”

Charles XII also tried to raise the spirit of his army. Inspiring the soldiers, Karl announced that tomorrow they would dine in the Russian convoy, where great booty awaited them.

Progress of the battle

Swedish attack on the redoubts

At two o'clock in the morning on June 27, Swedish infantry moved out from near Poltava in four columns, followed by six cavalry columns. By dawn, the Swedes entered the field in front of the Russian redoubts. Prince Menshikov, having lined up his dragoons in battle formation, moved towards the Swedes, wanting to meet them as early as possible and thereby gain time to prepare for the battle of the main forces.

When the Swedes saw the advancing Russian dragoons, their cavalry quickly galloped through the gaps between the columns of their infantry and quickly rushed at the Russian cavalry. By three o'clock in the morning a hot battle was already in full swing in front of the redoubts. At first, the Swedish cuirassiers pushed back the Russian cavalry, but, quickly recovering, the Russian cavalry pushed the Swedes back with repeated blows.

The Swedish cavalry retreated and the infantry went on the attack. The tasks of the infantry were as follows: one part of the infantry had to pass the redoubts without a fight towards the main camp of the Russian troops, while the other part, under the command of Ross, had to take the longitudinal redoubts in order to prevent the enemy from firing destructive fire on the Swedish infantry, which was advancing towards the fortified camp Russians. The Swedes took the first and second forward redoubts. Attacks on the third and other redoubts were repulsed.

The brutal stubborn battle lasted more than an hour; During this time, the main forces of the Russians managed to prepare for battle, and therefore Tsar Peter ordered the cavalry and defenders of the redoubts to retreat to the main position near the fortified camp. However, Menshikov did not obey the tsar’s order and, dreaming of finishing off the Swedes at the redoubts, continued the battle. Soon he was forced to retreat.

Field Marshal Renschild regrouped his troops, trying to bypass the Russian redoubts on the left. After capturing two redoubts, the Swedes were attacked by Menshikov's cavalry, but the Swedish cavalry forced them to retreat. According to Swedish historiography, Menshikov fled. However, the Swedish cavalry, obeying the general battle plan, did not develop their success.

During the mounted battle, six right-flank battalions of General Ross stormed the 8th redoubt, but were unable to take it, having lost up to half of their personnel during the attack. During the left flank maneuver of the Swedish troops, a gap formed between them and Ross's battalions and the latter were lost from sight. In an effort to find them, Renschild sent 2 more infantry battalions to search for them. However, Ross's troops were defeated by Russian cavalry.

Meanwhile, Field Marshal Renschild, seeing the retreat of the Russian cavalry and infantry, orders his infantry to break through the line of Russian fortifications. This order is immediately carried out.

Having broken through the redoubts, the main part of the Swedes came under heavy artillery and rifle fire from the Russian camp and retreated in disarray to the Budishchensky forest. At about six o'clock in the morning, Peter led the army out of the camp and built it in two lines, with infantry in the center, Menshikov's cavalry on the left flank, and General R. H. Bour's cavalry on the right flank. A reserve of nine infantry battalions was left in the camp. Renschild lined up the Swedes opposite the Russian army.

Decisive battle

At 9 o’clock in the morning, the remnants of the Swedish infantry, numbering about 4 thousand people, formed in one line, attacked the Russian infantry, lined up in two lines of about 8 thousand each. First, the opponents engaged in gunfire, then began hand-to-hand combat.

Encouraged by the presence of the king, the right wing of the Swedish infantry fiercely attacked the left flank of the Russian army. Under the onslaught of the Swedes, the first line of Russian troops began to retreat. According to Englund, the Kazan, Pskov, Siberian, Moscow, Butyrsky and Novgorod regiments (the leading battalions of these regiments) succumbed to enemy pressure, according to Englund. A dangerous gap in the battle formation formed in the front line of the Russian infantry: the Swedes “overthrew” the 1st battalion of the Novgorod regiment with a bayonet attack. Tsar Peter I noticed this in time, took the 2nd battalion of the Novogorod regiment and, at its head, rushed into a dangerous place.

The arrival of the king put an end to the successes of the Swedes and order on the left flank was restored. At first, the Swedes wavered in two or three places under the onslaught of the Russians.

The second line of Russian infantry joined the first, increasing pressure on the enemy, and the melting thin line of the Swedes no longer received any reinforcements. The flanks of the Russian army engulfed the Swedish battle formation. The Swedes were already tired of the intense battle.

Charles XII tried to inspire his soldiers and appeared in the place of the hottest battle. But the cannonball broke the king's stretcher, and he fell. The news of the death of the king swept through the ranks of the Swedish army with lightning speed. Panic began among the Swedes.

Having woken up from the fall, Charles XII orders himself to be placed on crossed peaks and raised high so that everyone can see him, but this measure did not help. Under the onslaught of Russian forces, the Swedes, who had lost formation, began a disorderly retreat, which by 11 o'clock turned into a real flight. The fainting king barely had time to be taken from the battlefield, put into a carriage and sent to Perevolochna.

According to Englund, the most tragic fate awaited two battalions of the Uppland Regiment, which were surrounded and completely destroyed (out of 700 people, only a few dozen remained alive).

Losses of the parties

Menshikov, having received reinforcements of 3,000 Kalmyk cavalry in the evening, pursued the enemy to Perevolochna on the banks of the Dnieper, where about 16,000 Swedes were captured.

In the battle, the Swedes lost over 11 thousand soldiers. Russian losses amounted to 1,345 killed and 3,290 wounded.

Results

As a result of the Battle of Poltava, the army of King Charles XII was so drained of blood that it could no longer conduct active offensive operations. He himself managed to escape with Mazepa and hid in the territory of the Ottoman Empire in Bendery. The military power of Sweden was undermined, and in the Northern War there was a turning point in favor of Russia. During the Battle of Poltava, Peter used tactics that are still mentioned in military schools. Shortly before the battle, Peter dressed the experienced soldiers in the uniform of the young ones. Karl, knowing that the form of experienced fighters is different from the form of young ones, led his army against the young fighters and fell into a trap.

Cards

The actions of Russian troops from the moment of the attempt to liberate Poltava from Vorskla until the end of the Battle of Poltava are shown.

Unfortunately, this most informative diagram cannot be placed here due to its dubious legal status - the original was published in the USSR with a total circulation of about 1,000,000 copies (!).

Memory of an event

• At the site of the battle, the Poltava Battlefield Museum-Reserve (now the National Museum-Reserve) was founded at the beginning of the 20th century. A museum was built on its territory, monuments to Peter I, Russian and Swedish soldiers were erected, on the site of the camp of Peter I, etc.
• In honor of the 25th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava (which took place on the day of St. Sampson the Host) in 1735, the sculptural group “Samson Tearing the Lion’s Jaw,” designed by Carlo Rastrelli, was installed in Peterhof. The lion was associated with Sweden, whose coat of arms contains this heraldic beast.

Monuments in Poltava:

• Monument of Glory
• Monument at the resting place of Peter I after the battle
• Monument to Colonel Kelin and the valiant defenders of Poltava.

On coins

In honor of the 300th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava, the Bank of Russia issued the following commemorative silver coins on June 1, 2009 (only reverses are shown):

In fiction

• A.S. Pushkin, “Poltava” - in the novel “Poltava Peremoga” by Oleg Kudrin (shortlist for the “Nonconformism-2010” award, “Nezavisimaya Gazeta”, Moscow) the event is considered, “replayed” in the genre of alternative history.

Images

Documentary films

• “The Battle of Poltava. 300 years later." — Russia, 2008

Feature films

• Servant of Sovereigns (film)
• Prayer for Hetman Mazepa (film)