What was Operation Sea Lion? Operation Sea Lion

Thus, Operation Catapult, as its critics feared, was at least - from a purely naval point of view - only half successful. Disgusted by this, as he put it, “dirty business,” Admiral Sommerville wrote in a letter to his wife: “I am afraid that I will get a big scolding from the Admiralty for allowing a battle cruiser to escape... I would not be surprised if after this I am removed from command . I won’t object because it was a completely unnecessary and bloody idea... To tell the truth, I didn’t like it.” He also called the attack "the greatest political mistake of our time", confident that it would turn the whole world against England. Captain Holland was so shocked by what happened that he asked to be relieved of command of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal.

In London, Winston Churchill outlined this “deplorable episode” to a silent House of Commons. He paid tribute to the courage of the French sailors, but stubbornly defended the inevitability of this “deadly blow.” When he finished his speech, once again emphasizing Britain's determination to "carry on the war with the greatest energy," all members of the House jumped to their feet in a long and tumultuous voice of approval. Tears rolled down Churchill's cheeks as he returned to his seat.

At Mers el-Kebir, Admiral Zhansoul buried more than 1,200 officers and sailors, of whom 210 died on his flagship. Of the leading characters in this tragedy, Zhansoul was consigned to oblivion and was not rehabilitated either by the Vichy government or by post-war France. Admiral Darlan was assassinated in Algiers in December 1942 by a young French royalist.

Of the ships that took part in this battle, the mighty Hood exploded and was lost with almost its entire crew in a battle with the German battleship Bismarck in May 1941 - a shell hit the powder magazine. The aircraft carrier Ark Royal was sunk by a German submarine in November 1941. The proud Strasbourg, like almost all the other French ships that escaped from Mers-el-Kébir, was scuttled by its crew at Toulon when German troops invaded the “previously unoccupied” zone of France in November 1942.

From any point of view, the "death blow" at Mers el-Kebir cast a long shadow over Anglo-French relations. Could it have been avoided? Was it necessary?

Historically, the most important consequence of Operation Catapult was its impact on Franklin Roosevelt and public opinion in the United States. In July 1940, Churchill's appeals to the Americans had a tangible effect on them, but the Americans doubted that Great Britain would be willing or able to continue the fight alone. One of the most influential (and vocal) skeptics of England's ability was the Anglophobe Joseph P. Kennedy, the American ambassador to London. Therefore, when deciding to sink the fleet of his former ally, Churchill undoubtedly took into account the impact of his move on America. It is not for nothing that in his memoirs, speaking about Mers el-Kebir, he pointed out: “It became clear that the English war cabinet was afraid of nothing and would stop at nothing.”

A few months later, Harry Hopkins, who enjoyed the full confidence of the American president, would report that this dramatic attack on the French fleet was more than anything else to convince Roosevelt of Churchill's (and Britain's) determination to continue the war.

Len Deighton

Any war is full of surprises and sudden events. The Second World War was replete with them, from the fall of France to the two nuclear bombs dropped on Japanese cities in August 1945. However, no event was as unexpected as the air battles between the British air force and the Luftwaffe that broke out over England in the summer of 1940.

Operation Sea Lion

Undoubtedly, after the fall of France, Hitler - and most of his advisers - would have preferred peace negotiations with England. Mussolini's son-in-law, Count Ciano, noted in his diary: “Hitler now looks like a gambler who, having hit a big jackpot, would like to leave the gambling table without taking any more risks.”

Hitler was so convinced that the game was over and England had lost that he disbanded 15 of his divisions and transferred 25 divisions to peacetime states. But the British also turned out to be gamblers, they wanted to take risks and win back.

In mid-July 1940, Hitler issued Directive No. 16. It began with the following sentence: “Since England, despite her hopeless military situation, shows no signs of being willing to compromise, I have decided to prepare an amphibious operation against England and, if necessary, carry it out.” . The operation was given the code name "Sea Lion". Many historians argue that the above phrase indicates that Hitler did not seriously intend to carry out this operation. A more convincing confirmation of the unreality of Directive No. 16 is the timing of readiness for its implementation: “All preparations must be completed by mid-August.”

Having received this directive, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Grand Admiral Raeder, responded to it immediately. The admirals agreed with her, however, pointing out that no dates for action could be determined until the Luftwaffe had gained air superiority over the Strait of Dover (English Channel). At the same time, they presented their draft operation, and on July 28, the command of the ground forces carefully studied it. Naval operators proposed a landing area near Dover. Using the narrowest part of the strait, they could lay minefields on the flanks of the corridor along which the ships of the invasion force would move. Despite the difficulties of operating in the shallow areas of the English Channel, there would be a group of submarines in them, while another group would cover the flank facing the North Sea. According to calculations, the navy needed 10 days to deliver the first shock wave of the landing force to the English coast. The command of the ground forces was horrified by these calculations.

The army informed the fleet of the need to land troops on the section of the southern coast of England from Folkestone to Brighton (the main direction) and in the Cherbourg - Plymouth direction (a diversionary landing). The ground forces needed tanks and vehicles, which meant using all ferries to transport vehicles, as well as cross-strait facilities. The first echelon of troops was supposed to land on the shore in three days. The priority targets for capture were large areas of southern England, stretching almost all the way to London. If we take all this seriously, the first echelon should have included 280 thousand people, 30 thousand vehicles and tanks and 60 thousand horses! After reviewing the fleet's proposals, the Wehrmacht's Commander-in-Chief Brauchitsch and his Chief of Staff Halder firmly stated: "We cannot carry out our part of this operation with the help of the means provided by the Navy."

On July 31, Hitler summoned the commanders-in-chief of the ground and naval forces to his dacha in the Bavarian Alps, near Berchtesgaden. Raeder was the first to convey his point of view. Preparations are proceeding as quickly as circumstances allow. The naval forces scoured all the ports of occupied Europe in search of suitable vehicles, but their conversion for military purposes and delivery to the ports of the Bay of Dover could not be completed before 15 September. In view of Army demands for landings on a wider front and the prospect of autumn storms, it would be better to plan the landings for May 1941, Raeder said.

Hitler was not angry at this proposal, but pointed out that the British army would be better prepared to repel an invasion the following year, and noted that the weather in May was unlikely to be much better than in September.

After sending Raeder home, Hitler continued to review the plan for Operation Sea Lion with the command of the ground forces. On one point he went so far as to express doubts about the “technical feasibility” of the entire operation. However, no doubts of this kind were reflected in the directive issued the next day. It was signed by Field Marshal Keitel and came from the Wehrmacht High Command, personally controlled by Hitler. Preparations were to be completed by September 15. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe had to launch an offensive in large forces. Depending on the results of the air raids at the end of August, Hitler had to decide on an invasion.

Operation Sea Lion(German) Unternehmen Seelowe) is the code name for Hitler's planned landing operation on the British Isles. The plan was established on July 16, 1940. According to it, German troops were to cross the English Channel, land between Dover and Portsmouth in about 25 divisions, and then advance to cut off London. The front was supposed to stretch from Folkestone to Bognor. Military command was entrusted to Field Marshal Rundstedt.

The start date for the operation was constantly postponed. On January 9, 1941, after defeat in the Battle of Britain, Hitler gave the order to cancel the landing on Britain. On February 13, 1942, the commander of the Kriegsmarine, Admiral Raeder, spoke with Hitler for the last time about Operation Sea Lion and convinced him to agree to stop any preparations in this direction.

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Excerpt describing Operation Sea Lion

“I don’t... please, your Excellency,” said Prince Andrei quietly. Arakcheev's eyes turned to him.
“Sit down,” said Arakcheev, “Prince Bolkonsky?”
“I’m not asking for anything, but the Emperor deigned to forward the note I submitted to your Excellency...”
“Please see, my dear, I read your note,” Arakcheev interrupted, saying only the first words affectionately, again without looking him in the face and falling more and more into a grumpily contemptuous tone. – Are you proposing new military laws? There are many laws, and there is no one to enforce the old ones. Nowadays all laws are written; it is easier to write than to do.
“I came by the will of the Emperor to find out from your Excellency what course you intend to give to the submitted note?” - said Prince Andrei politely.
“I have added a resolution to your note and forwarded it to the committee.” “I don’t approve,” said Arakcheev, getting up and taking a paper from the desk. - Here! – he handed it to Prince Andrey.
On the paper across it, in pencil, without capital letters, without spelling, without punctuation, it was written: “unfoundedly composed as an imitation copied from the French military regulations and from the military article without the need of retreating.”
– Which committee was the note sent to? - asked Prince Andrei.
- To the committee on military regulations, and I submitted a proposal to enroll your honor as a member. Just no salary.

Operation Sea Lion was supposed to end within a month after it began. The command of the operations to defeat England was entrusted to Field Marshal Rundstedt, who ensured the defeat of France within six weeks. naval military england intelligence

At the next stage of the campaign, the army group of Field Marshal Bock was supposed to enter the fight. Hitler took upon himself the overall leadership of the defeat of England.

The German command, preparing to implement their predatory plans, ordered the main headquarters of the army, naval forces and air force to relocate to the landing preparation area by August 1st. Thousands of other documents from the fascist general staff, the headquarters of army groups and individual armies, corps, divisions, regiments, even battalions, testify to how widely and carefully the Operation Sea Lion was prepared.

Among these documents you can find printed memos “On the loading of troops onto ships”, “On the first battle after landing”, “On the conduct of troops on board landing ships”, “On overcoming water obstacles by assault boats, transports and using suspension bridges”2.

Some materials analyze the tactics of the British army and English volunteers and, accordingly, the behavior and tactics of the fascist troops. The combat training department of the General Staff of the Ground Forces compiled a special instruction “Combat in the Fog.”

The directives of the fascist German command, with great methodicality and scrupulousness, set tasks not only for the army, navy and air force, but also for the engineering service, signal corps, other branches of the military, right down to bakery companies, sanitary, supply and other units. The issues of providing troops with electricity and supplying paratroopers with water were thought through.

One of the Speidel brothers, who served in the department of the chief intendant, was appointed responsible for this (Hans Speidel himself at that time headed the headquarters of the fascist occupiers in France and Belgium). True, there were significant shortcomings in the plans of Hitler’s command: the issue of organizing air defense of landing areas, the paratroopers that were supposed to be dropped in the vicinity of London and other English cities remained unresolved, and there was no solution to a number of other specific problems.

However, all these shortcomings could undoubtedly be eliminated in the future. Particular attention in the directives of the fascist command was paid to ensuring the secrecy of the landing.

One of the points of Hitler’s Directive No. 16 read: “Preparation of the planned landing must be strictly classified. The very fact of preparations for a landing in England cannot be hidden. It is all the more important to classify by all means the time of the planned landing and the crossing areas.”

To ensure the surprise of the invasion, the German command developed secret plans to disinformation the enemy. One of von Bock’s orders to Army Group B contained a special requirement to carry out “disinformation in orders.”

According to many Western European historians - K. Klee, K. Assmann, Liddell-Hart and others, the German command could well have completed all preparations for the landing in August September 1940.

German superiority over England

What British forces did the German command plan to fight? According to intelligence data from the German General Staff, at the beginning of August 1940, the British army had 13-14 divisions on the coast to defend the south of the country.

The total strength of the active army was estimated by intelligence at 320 thousand people, the reserve army - at 100 thousand instructors and 900 thousand possible recruits1. In fact, according to Churchill's data from August 1940, 8 divisions were concentrated along the entire southern coast of England. In the second half of September, after extraordinary measures to form new formations, the British command had 16 divisions on the wide front of the southern coast, three of them armored2.

Only in June did the British War Cabinet decide to reorganize the field army, which would have 26 divisions; Of these, only 2 divisions would be tank divisions3. By mid-August, according to British data, these 26 divisions had been created.

But what kind of “shock fist” was this between Churchill and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Allan Brooke, who replaced General Ironside in this post? Hitler's General Staff clearly overestimated the enemy's strength. True, by September 1940 the combat effectiveness of the British army had increased somewhat.

Tank units numbered 240 medium and 108 heavy vehicles at the beginning of the month. The number of light tanks reached 514 units4. The production of fighter aircraft has increased sharply. Instead of the 903 fighters planned in July-August, 1418 were produced, that is, 1.5 times more.

However, the fascist army had an overwhelming superiority of forces. The German ground forces were 7-8 times larger than the British, and the Wehrmacht's weapons were 15-20 times stronger. Of the 170 German divisions, fully equipped, well-armed, with extensive experience in aggressive campaigns in Poland, Belgium, Holland and France, the Nazi command was ready to send 38 divisions, including 6 tank and 3 motorized, for a direct invasion of the British Isles5.

It is interesting that for Operation Overlord - the landing of armies in Northern France - England and the USA concentrated 36-39 divisions. No wonder W. Churchill bitterly admitted: “Truly, the Germans had no shortage of fierce, well-armed soldiers.”

To transport such a gigantic landing force, up to 4 thousand sea vessels with a total tonnage of 800-900 thousand tons were required. By the beginning of September 1940, the German naval headquarters, having confiscated the fleets of Denmark, Belgium, Holland, and France, had at its disposal 168 transport ships (with a displacement of 700 thousand tons), 1,910 barges, 419 tugs, 1,200 motor boats, initially concentrated in Wilhelmshaven and Kiel, Cuxhaven and Bremen, Emden and Hamburg.

This was significantly more than Admiral Raeder required. Churchill believed that the Nazi command had ships that could transport 500 thousand people simultaneously6. On September 1, in connection with preparations for the transfer of troops to England, intensive movement of German ships began to French, Belgian, and Dutch harbors, to the area of ​​​​the planned invasion.

The fascist German command created a powerful fist to strike at the British Isles, at “proud Albion”, almost 900 years since William the Conqueror, which had not experienced the bitterness of an enemy invasion. A terrible threat looms over Britain.

Exercises to force the English Channel “Coastal Battle”

The fact that the German invasion of England was not a bluff is evidenced by the practical steps to cross the English Channel taken by the Wehrmacht command in July - August 1940.

German troops and headquarters underwent accelerated training. Moreover, on July 29, the combat training department of the German General Staff drew up an order entitled “Preparation for the operation.” Training cruises and battles, the order said, were to be carried out in conditions close to a combat situation, to teach the troops everything they should know when landing from ships on the shore and in the first battles on the coast. Learn to use smoke screens.

To organize rehearsal exercises for crossing the English Channel, headquarters developed detailed documentation, bringing the exercises as close as possible to a real combat situation. Thus, one of the many developments of the divisional exercise “Coastal Battle” included a detailed plan for crossing the strait.

The order of the commander of Army Group B von Bock “On measures to prepare for an attack on England and Ireland” was very detailed, specific and eloquently testified to the predatory plans of the fascist command. This is also confirmed by many other documents of the General Staff, the command of army groups “A” and “B” and individual armies, the Air Force command, and the naval headquarters.

On July 30, the plan for Operation Sea Lion was discussed in detail at the General Staff of the Ground Forces. Chief of Staff Halder announced to the crowd Hitler's decision to invade England.

Giving a general military-operational assessment of the actions of Nazi Germany against England, Halder characterized them as a single complex of many operations. He warned against overestimating England's coastal fortifications and demanded that the command of the Air Force and Navy take merciless action against the English fleet.

Hitler and the German high command conducted not only military-strategic, but also political preparations for the landing in England. On Hitler's instructions, fascist diplomacy and generals sought the complete political isolation of England, so that in the days of the decisive battle not a single state would come to its aid.

Ribbentrop's department took part in the political preparations for the fascist invasion of England, and the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the main command and general staff of the ground forces, H. Etzdorf, was especially active. Thus, on October 8, 1940, Etzdorf conveyed Hitler’s instructions to Halder: the main task of fascist diplomacy is to create a coalition of powers against England.

At other meetings with Brauchitsch and Halder, Etzdorf repeatedly advocated that England should be completely isolated. Even at the meeting on July 22, he spoke about the need to prevent a rapprochement between England and the Soviet Union.

Intelligence and special services in Operation Sea Lion

German intelligence also worked a lot in preparing the defeat of England, and in particular in preparing Operation Sea Lion.

Agents of the German Abwehr and other spy agencies of Nazi Germany had their agents in this country. Extensive files with a wide variety of intelligence data were collected in the secret safes of the fascist general staff.

The multi-volume files of fascist intelligence contained detailed data not only on the topography, terrain, political, administrative and economic centers of England, but also on airfields, naval bases, landmarks for aviation, etc. The dossier contained numerous aerial photographs of cities, harbors, naval and air bases, equipped with very eloquent inscriptions and characteristics about the purposes of bombing and fascist sabotage. A separate volume contained spy information about Greater London.

The secret files of the Wehrmacht main headquarters contained spy materials about the British Air Force bases near Plymouth, about the docks in Birkenhead and Port Talbot and about many other objects1. Is it any wonder that in the summer and autumn of 1940, fascist aviation pilots carried out precise targeted bombing of London and Coventry, Birmingham and Portsmouth, Manchester and Hull.

Hitler and his henchmen considered the conquest of England almost a done deal. At a meeting held in the Reich Chancellery on July 21, attended by the leaders of the army, air force and navy, Hitler firmly announced the beginning of the decisive stage of the war against England. He had no doubt that victory over the enemy was imminent and therefore ordered “the completion of the main part of Operation Sea Lion” by September 152.

The German command (as well as the English Navy Ministry) believed that the most favorable time for landing troops in the stormy English Channel, taking into account the corresponding phase of the moon, high and low tide, was the period between September 15 and 30. True, during the preparation of the operation, fierce disputes arose between the commands of the three types of armed forces of the fascist “Reich” on the issue of the scale of the landing front.

The ambitious Goering, who commanded the air force, did not want to play a modest role in the general plan for the conquest of England. He believed that only the forces of German aviation could bring England to its knees. Therefore, the Air Force command developed its own plans, which were not coordinated with Halder and Raeder.

Goering assured the Fuhrer of the possibility of “bombing England out of the war,” arguing that the hardships of war and continuous bombing would lead to the overthrow of Churchill’s government, would frighten the enemy, break his will to fight and force English politicians to make peace with Germany.

German generals believed that the success of German plans for a landing in England would depend on whether Germany would be able to achieve air superiority over the Channel and the southern cities of England and destroy British aircraft and airfields near London. Preparing loading ports, concentrating transports in the ports of France, clearing passages from mines and installing new minefields, covering the landing force from the air, landing it - all this, they believed, was impossible without establishing German Air Force dominance in the air.

A decision of “special importance.” Directive “On intensifying the air and sea war against England.”

At a secret military council on July 31, 1940, at Hitler’s Berghof, the fascist military leaders Keitel, Jodl, Brauchitsch, Halder, and Raeder made a decision of “special importance,” which largely determined the further course of the war.

At this council, plans for war were considered not so much against England as against the USSR. Hitler said that England was holding on only with the hope of support from the Soviet Union and the United States. If Russia, Hitler inspired the generals and admirals who silently listened to him, is crushed, Britain's last hope will be destroyed. Then Germany will be the ruler of Europe1.

The main conclusions of the meeting were Hitler's order to intensify preparations for the invasion of England and, if it did not take place, planning a war against the USSR for the spring of 1941. However, he did not allow the possibility of a war on two fronts.

As a follow-up to this order, the commander-in-chief of the German ground forces, Brauchitsch, issued “top secret instructions” on August 30 for the invasion of the British Isles. “The Supreme Commander-in-Chief,” the directive read, “has ordered the armed forces to complete preparations for the landing in England. The purpose of the attack is to crush England as a base for continuing the war against Germany and, if necessary, to carry out its occupation.”2

The instructions defined tasks for the ground forces, navy and aviation. Hitler attached particular importance to German aviation in achieving victory over England. He told the audience: “If, after eight days of intense air war, German aircraft do not destroy a significant part of the enemy’s aircraft, ports and naval forces, the entire operation will have to be postponed until May 1941.”3

Hitler was faced with a dilemma - either immediately invade England and conquer it, or, as Churchill admitted, "he faced an endless continuation of the war with all the innumerable dangers and complications." Since, the Fuhrer believed, victory over England in the air would put an end to its resistance, the invasion of the British Isles would be only the finale to the end of the occupation of the country.

Therefore, on August 1, 1940, he signed Directive No. 17 “On intensifying the air and sea war against England.” “In order to create the preconditions for the final defeat of England,” it said, “I intend to continue the air and sea war against England more energetically than it has been so far.”4

German aviation was ordered to deliver crushing blows as soon as possible to aviation units, airfields and supply bases, and then to military installations, ports and especially food warehouses within the country. The Nazis wanted to break the resistance of the English people not only with the force of bombs, but also with the bony hand of hunger.

The 2nd and 3rd German air fleets deployed against England included 2,200 combat aircraft: 1,100 bombers, including 346 dive bombers, 900 single-engine fighters, 120 heavy twin-engine fighters5. According to inflated British data, England had at that time 240 bombers and 960 fighters.

In other words, the Germans could throw four bombers against every British fighter and more than two of their fighters against every British fighter. At the same time, Germany used only 1/3 of its air force against England.

"Battle of England". Invasion of the British Isles.

During June and early July, the Nazi air armies prepared to deliver a decisive blow to the British Isles.

After preliminary reconnaissance and test flights, the first large German air raid was carried out on July 10. The fierce “Battle of England” began. Three main stages of the German air offensive can be distinguished.

The first stage was from July 10 to August 18, when the main attacks of German aircraft were carried out on British military and merchant ships in the English Channel and on the southern ports of England from Dover to Plymouth. The German command set the task of involving British aviation in the battle and exhausting it, as well as striking at those seaports of Southern England that were to become targets of invasion under the Sea Lion plan.

At the second stage - from August 24 to September 27 - the German command sought to pave the way to London, eliminate British aviation and its bases, radar stations, as well as military-industrial facilities. The third and final stage came when Operation Sea Lion was postponed.

London, “the world’s largest target,” was subjected to especially fierce bombing. The residents of the capital suffered severe trials. From September 7 to November 3, for 57 nights in a row, German aircraft bombed the English capital and its environs.

On average, 200 bombers flew over London. The Nazis hoped to paralyze the British capital with a population of 7 million with fierce bombing, intimidate the English people and force the government to make peace. However, the Germans only sowed a storm of anger among the English people.

On the night of September 6, 68 German planes bombed London, but this was only reconnaissance. On September 7, 300 heavy bombers fiercely bombed London during the daytime. By order of Hitler, the main blow was struck at railway junctions and London docks, in the area of ​​which the largest food warehouses with supplies for the entire country were located.

At the docks, a huge fire was raging from incendiary and high-explosive bombs: grain was burning; Molten sugar flowed out like fiery lava; the rubber was burning, enveloping the ashes in black acrid smoke; barrels of paint, whiskey and wine exploded.

From 20:00 to 07:00 in the morning, in the light of raging fires, another 250 bombers appeared over London. Thousands of Londoners - old people, women and children were buried under the ruins of houses and died in the flames.

German bombs hit the English Parliament building and turned many government buildings around Whitehall into ruins. Eight London churches designed by the immortal architect Christopher Wren have been reduced to ruins. Only the heroic efforts of Londoners managed to save St. Paul and the tombs of Wellington and Nelson.

Particularly fierce, “classic,” as Churchill called it, was the Nazi air raid on the citadel of England’s financial bosses, the City of London. The fires were Hitler’s “gratitude” for the millions of pounds sterling that the City of London bankers lent to the German fascists.

The bombs dropped on Buckingham Palace destroyed the palace church and uprooted the trees of the palace garden. Many times during the brutal bombings, the monarch of England, George, along with the prime minister, had to rush down to the unfinished shelter of Buckingham Palace.

Decisive turning point in the Battle of England

15. IX. 1940, according to Churchill, one of the decisive battles for England took place, a kind of “Battle of Waterloo”.

On this day, the German Air Force carried out its largest massive daytime raid on London, sending over 1,000 aircraft to the city. The largest air battle took place. That same day, Churchill left his residence at Checkers and arrived in Uxbridge, at the headquarters of Air Vice-Marshal Park, who commanded the 11th Air Group of the RAF.

Churchill was ushered into the operations center, located in a hardened bomb shelter 50 feet underground. He barely had time to descend when a message was immediately received that “more than 40” enemy aircraft had taken off from German airfields in the Dieppe area. Signals followed one after another: “60-plus” and then “80-plus.” More and more waves of attacking enemy aircraft were coming to bomb London.

All of Park's English squadrons got involved in a fierce battle. Churchill noticed the worry on the vice-marshal’s face and asked: “What other reserves do we have?” “There are no more reserves,” he answered quietly. The position of the British Air Force was desperate.

Who knows, Churchill recalled, what would have happened to England if the enemy had abandoned another hundred or two aircraft at a time when the British squadrons, forced to refuel and replenish ammunition every 70-80 minutes, were on the ground. But the Germans did not do this.

In the afternoon Churchill returned to Checkers. After resting, he called the chief private secretary, J. Martin, with the evening update. They were sad. “However,” Martin said, concluding his report, “all this is redeemed by the situation in the air. We shot down 183 aircraft, losing less than 40."

True, data obtained after the war showed that German aviation losses amounted to only 56 aircraft, and British ones - 26. Still, Churchill was inclined to consider September 15 a turning point in the “Battle of Britain.” Undoubtedly, the German air force command, which Churchill also admitted, made a serious strategic mistake by concentrating the main attacks on London.

Continuing raids on airfields would be much more dangerous for the fate of England. When German aircraft carried out massive attacks on airfields, they thereby jeopardized the operational centers and telephone communications of the British Air Force.

The entire complex system of organizing English fighter aviation was literally hanging by a thread, but when Goering transferred his bombing to London, the British fighter aviation command breathed freely. The history of the “Battle of Britain” was the history of Goering’s contradictory plans that were not fully implemented, and a haphazard change of priority targets for military bombing.

The German naval headquarters recognized the ineffectiveness of Goering’s “air war” without taking into account the requirements of naval warfare and outside the framework of Operation Sea Lion. In the form in which Goering waged this war, it “could not,” as the German naval headquarters admitted, “help prepare for Operation Sea Lion.”

As before, English ships operated almost unhindered in the English Channel and the Dover Canal. It was only at the end of September 1940 that Goering abandoned the hope of turning London into heaps of ruins.

It would be appropriate to make here some critical remarks regarding Hitler's plan for landing in England, and in particular the reasons that led to the abandonment of this intention.

If Hitler, after the victory over France, really thought that the war had already been won and all that remained was to instill this idea in England, then he was clearly mistaken. The cold refusal with which his extremely vague peace proposal was met in England showed that neither the English government nor the English people were inclined to such an idea.

Hitler and his OKB now faced the question: “What now?” This question inevitably arises before a statesman or commander when, during a period of war, strategic blunders or unexpected political events, for example, the entry of new states into the war on the enemy’s side, create a completely new situation. Then there is nothing else left to do but change the “military plan.” In this case, the relevant figures can be reproached for overestimating the strength of their state and underestimating the strength of the enemy, and for incorrectly assessing the political situation.

But if statesmen and military leaders must ask themselves the question “What now?” after military operations according to their calculations - in this case even beyond all calculations - led to victory over the enemy, if the defeated enemy escaped to safety on his islands, then one has to ask oneself whether the German side had any “military plan” at all "

Of course, no war proceeds according to a once established program, according to a plan developed by one side. But if Hitler took the risk of war with France and England in September 1939, he should have thought in advance how to deal with these states. It is clear that the German High Command before and during the French campaign had no "war plan" as to what should be done after winning the war or how to continue it. Hitler hoped for England's compliance. His military advisers, in turn, believed that it was necessary to wait for “the decisions of the Fuhrer.”

This example shows especially clearly the consequences of the inappropriate organization of the highest military bodies that has developed in our country as a result of the transfer of the Main Command of the armed forces to Hitler without the simultaneous creation of an imperial General Staff responsible for directing all military actions.

In fact, along with the head of state who determined policy, there was no military authority that would be responsible for directing military operations. Hitler had long ago reduced the OKB to the position of a military secretariat. The head of the OKB, Keitel, was generally not in a position to give advice to Hitler on strategic issues.

Hitler gave the commanders of the three branches of the armed forces almost no rights to influence the overall direction of military operations. They could only occasionally express their opinions on matters of war, but Hitler made decisions, in the end, only on the basis of his own considerations. In any case, he reserved the right of initiative, so I do not know of a single case (with the exception of the question of Norway, when Grand Admiral Raeder first suggested to him the idea of ​​​​action in this area) when an important decision in matters of the general conduct of war would come from command of one of the branches of the armed forces.

Since no one had the right to draw up a “military plan,” and least of all, of course, the OKB, almost everything boiled down to the fact that everyone was waiting for the manifestation of the “Fuhrer’s intuition.” Some, like Keitel and Goering, are in superstitious reverence for Hitler, others, like Brauchitsch and Raeder, are disheartened. The fact that at the headquarters of the three branches of the armed forces there were opinions that affected issues of waging war for a long time did not change anything. Thus, back in the winter of 1939/40, Grand Admiral Raeder ordered the General Headquarters of the Naval Forces to study the technical capabilities and conditions of the landing operation in England. But there was not a single military authority, not a single person who, in the spirit of the activities of a genuine Chief of the General Staff, was recognized by Hitler not only as an expert or executor, but also as a military adviser on issues of general management of military operations.

In the present case, the result of such an organization of the highest military bodies was that after the end of the campaign in the west of our continent, as already said, the question arose: “What now?”

Along with this question, the top German leadership was faced with two facts:

1. The fact of the existence of Great Britain, which is not defeated and does not agree to negotiations.

2. The fact that Germany, in connection with the possible sooner or later entry into the war of the Soviet Union, which has now become its immediate neighbor (no matter how peacefully the Kremlin may now seem to be peace-loving towards Germany), was under the hidden threat of war, which was mentioned Hitler back in 1939, when he emphasized the need to immediately achieve victory in the west.

These facts indicated that Germany must end the war with England in the shortest possible time. Only if this succeeded could it be considered that Stalin had finally missed the opportunity to use the discord between European states to continue his expansionist policy.

If it is not possible to find a peaceful way to resolve the issue, Germany must try, through the use of military force, to quickly deal with its last enemy at that time - England.

The tragedy of this short period of time, which determined the fate of Europe for a long time, was the fact that both sides did not seriously seek ways to peacefully resolve the issue on a reasonable basis.

It is quite safe to say that Hitler would have preferred to avoid war with the British Empire, since his main goals were in the east. But the method which he chose at the meeting of the Reichstag after the end of the campaign in France for such a vague peace proposal to Great Britain could hardly have evoked a favorable response from the other side. Moreover, it is doubtful that Hitler, who by that time had already been overcome by criminal delusions of grandeur, would have been ready for peace on the basis of reason and justice if England itself had made a serious proposal for this. Moreover, Hitler was already in captivity of his previous deeds. He gave half of Poland and the Baltic states to the Soviet Union - a fact that he could only eliminate at the cost of a new war. He opened the way to satisfying Italy's aspirations to seize areas under French domination, and thereby found himself dependent on his ally. Finally, after Prague, the world no longer believed him, and he lost all confidence among the powers, which, perhaps, would have shown a readiness to conclude treaties with him that would meet his aspirations.

The German people, however, would en masse admire Hitler if, after his victory over France, he achieved an agreed peace on a reasonable basis. The people did not want the areas in which the Polish population predominated to be annexed to Germany, they also did not approve of the ideas of some dreamers who, citing ancient history, wanted to substantiate these claims, pointing out that these were once areas of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation . In Germany, with the exception of some fanatics in the party, there was never any serious belief in the idea of ​​a "people" called upon to rule in Europe or even in the whole world. The people only needed Hitler to quiet his pack of propagandists, paving the way for a rational world.

On the other hand, the English national character, so fully embodied in the personality of the head of government, Churchill, prevented England in that phase of the war from seriously seeking then - and later - a reasonable constructive agreement. One has to be surprised at the tenacity of the British, who, under all circumstances, decided to continue the struggle they had begun, no matter how threatening their position sometimes was. To this we must also add that this bitterness, “unyielding hatred” of Hitler and his regime (among some politicians and in relation to Prussian Germany) dulled the ability to recognize an even more formidable danger that had arisen in Europe in the person of the Soviet Union. It is also obvious that British policy was captivated by traditional considerations of the “European balance” (to restore which England ultimately entered the war), which presupposed the overthrow of a state on the continent that had become too powerful. They turned a blind eye to the fact that in a changed world it was necessary to restore “world balance” due to the fact that the Soviet Union had become a great power, and in view of the danger that this country, devoted to the idea of ​​world revolution, posed to Europe.

In addition, the head of the British government, Churchill, was too militant. This was a man who thought exclusively about war and the desired victory and looked at the political future through the prism of these military goals. Only a few years later, when the Soviets had already approached the Balkans - this nerve center of Great Britain, Churchill recognized the danger inherent here. But at that time he could not do anything, having Roosevelt and Stalin as allies. At first he believed in the strength of his people and that the United States would eventually fight the war, led by its president, on the side of England. But how little was the bulk of the American people ready for this at that time, with all their antipathy towards Hitler!

The hidden threat that posed to Germany from the Soviet Union could not, of course, escape the gaze of a man like Churchill. As for the war, he saw it as hope for England. On the contrary, the thought of an agreement with Germany found no place in his mind, since such an agreement would most likely be followed in the near future by a struggle between both totalitarian states. Although a sound weighing of the strengths and weaknesses of both states did not allow us to confidently expect a complete victory for one of them, it was possible to hope that they would both commit themselves to such a war for a long time, which would lead to their mutual weakening. This situation will inevitably have the consequence that both Anglo-Saxon powers will be given the role of justices of the peace. It is also possible that a war between both totalitarian states will lead to the death of their regimes.

In times of dictatorships, ideologies, “crusades”, inflaming the masses of the people with unbridled propaganda, the word “Reason”, unfortunately, is not written with a capital letter anywhere. So, to the detriment of both peoples and to the misfortune of Europe, it turned out that both sides chose the path of resolving the dispute between England and Germany with the help of weapons.

The question “What now?”, which confronted the German high command after the end of the war with France, was therefore resolved in the spirit of continuing the war against England. But the fact that, for the reasons I have stated, Germany had no war plan which would provide for the continuation of hostilities after the campaign in France, was bound to lead to grave consequences. After Hitler adopted the plan (but not the decision) to overthrow England by invasion, no practical preparations were made for the task. The result was that we missed our best chance of immediately exploiting England's weakness. The measures now taken for the offensive took a long time, so the success of the landing was doubtful due to the meteorological conditions alone.

This last fact, along with others that I will talk about later, gave Hitler a reason or pretext, having refused the invasion, to turn his back on England altogether, in order to then move against the Soviet Union. The results are known.

Before dwelling on the reasons for this decisive change of front, I will dwell on the possibilities that would have arisen if Hitler had been prepared to wage war with England to the last.

There were three possible ways here. The first way is an attempt to bring England to its knees by blockading its sea communications. Germany had favorable preconditions for this, since it now owned the coasts of Norway, Holland, Belgium and France as bases for aviation and submarines.

The situation with the means of struggle necessary for this was less favorable.

The Navy by no means had even approximately enough submarines, let alone heavy ships, especially aircraft carriers, with which the submarines could interact. In addition, it turned out that England's fight against submarines would be effective until British aviation was destroyed.

As for German aviation, the following tasks would fall to its share in this fight:

- to gain air supremacy, at least to such an extent that would exclude the influence of British aviation on submarine warfare;

– paralysis of English ports through their destruction;

– effective interaction with submarines in the fight against enemy transports.

In practice, this should have been a prerequisite for the destruction of British aviation and the destruction of England's military potential.

The course of the “Battle of Britain” showed that German aviation in 1940 was not strong enough to accomplish this task. It is not worth deciding now whether the results would have been different if the weather conditions in August and September had not been so unfavorable (which could not be expected) and if the German leadership had not stopped would have fought against British aviation and would not have sent planes to London.

In any case, in the summer of 1940, due to the limited number of bomber aircraft and the lack of fighters with a long range, one could hardly confidently expect a quick achievement of the goal: the destruction of British aviation and the destruction of England's military potential. The war, which was largely to be resolved by technical means, still required much more effort and time than we had expected. In a war between approximately equal opponents, a quick outcome, as a rule, is achieved only by the best military art and, less often, as a result of the struggle of armed forces until one of the opponents is exhausted, as would inevitably happen here.

Therefore, it was necessary from the very beginning to prepare for a long war. To ensure success, it was necessary to increase military aviation in the same way as the submarine fleet was increased at one time.

I must state quite clearly that the idea that such a large country as Great Britain could be quickly brought to its knees by "operational air war" in the spirit of General Douhet was, at least at that time, only a dream. The same thing was revealed later in the Allied air war against Germany. In any case, if they decided to defeat England by blockading sea communications, it was necessary to turn all the country’s military power to strengthening the submarine fleet and aviation. To do this, it was necessary to reduce the ground army in order to free up manpower.

The main danger was hidden in the prolongation of this war. No one could know how long the Soviet Union would wait. If we had taken the path of reducing the ground army and tied our aviation to the fight against England, then the Soviet Union, even if it had not entered the war, would have taken the path of political blackmail.

Another danger lay in the possibility of America entering the war at an early stage. It is unlikely that she would calmly watch how England was slowly being strangled. America might have entered this air-naval war relatively early, but in the event of a German invasion of England at that time it would have been late.

Still, if Germany had a truly unified military leadership, it would be possible to decide on this path with the hope of success, however, given the constant threat of intervention from the Soviet Union or America. And this, of course, only if we strictly limit ourselves to the goal of destroying British aviation and blockade of its sea communications. Any deviation towards dubious ideas of fighting against the spirit of the enemy people by raiding cities could only jeopardize the success of the war.

The second possible path that could be taken to defeat England is called the war for the Mediterranean. Hitler or the German military command was generally reproached for the fact that they could not break away from the shackles of continental thinking. They allegedly could never correctly appreciate the importance of the Mediterranean Sea as the lifeblood of the British Empire. It is possible that Hitler thought in continental terms. But another question is whether the loss of the Mediterranean by England would really lead to its refusal to continue the war, and also what consequences the conquest of the Mediterranean region would have for Germany.

Undoubtedly, the loss of positions in the Mediterranean would be a heavy blow for Great Britain. This could greatly affect India, the Middle East and thus the oil supply to England. In addition, a final blockade of her communications in the Mediterranean would greatly undermine England's supplies. But would this blow be fatal? This question, in my opinion, must be answered in the negative. In this case, the route to the Far and Middle East through the Cape of Good Hope would remain open for England, which could not be blocked in any way. In this case, it would be necessary to create a tight blockade ring around the British Isles with the help of submarines and aircraft, that is, choose the first path. But this would require the concentration of all aviation here, so there would be nothing left for the Mediterranean Sea! No matter how painful the loss of Gibraltar, Malta, positions in Egypt and the Middle East might be for England, this blow would not be fatal for her. On the contrary, these losses would rather harden the British will to fight - this is in their character. The British nation would not have recognized these losses as fatal and would have continued the fight even more fiercely! She would, apparently, refute the well-known assertion that the Mediterranean Sea is the life artery of the British Empire. It is also very doubtful that the dominions will not follow England as she continues the struggle.

The second question is what consequences the outcome of the decisive struggle for the Mediterranean would have for Germany.

The first is that Italy could provide a good base for this struggle, but that its armed forces would make a very modest contribution to the struggle. This position did not require confirmation by events, since everything was already clear then. In particular, it could not be expected that the Italian fleet would be able to expel the British from the Mediterranean. Germany, therefore, had to bear the brunt of this struggle, in addition, the matter could be complicated by the fact that the Italian ally would consider the Mediterranean Sea as its water area and would put forward its claims to occupy a dominant position there.

If we wanted to deprive Great Britain of its positions in the Mediterranean, hoping to deal it a mortal blow, then it was necessary to take Malta and Gibraltar and expel the British from Greece and Egypt. There is no doubt that the German armed forces, if they had transferred their operations to the Mediterranean region, would have solved this problem militarily. However, this path would inevitably lead further. The capture of Gibraltar required either the consent of Spain, which in fact could not be obtained, or it was necessary to put pressure on Spain. In both cases this would lead to the end of Spain's neutrality. Germany would have no choice but to organize the protection of the coast of the Iberian Peninsula, with or against the will of the Spanish and Portuguese governments, and at the same time take over the supply of this area. It would be necessary to take into account resistance both in Spain and, above all, in Portugal, which believed that its colonies in this case would soon be occupied by the British. In any case, the Iberian Peninsula would have absorbed a significant part of the German army for a long time. A forced occupation of the countries of the Iberian Peninsula could have a catastrophic effect on the United States and Latin American countries.

If it were not possible to reach a real understanding with France, which was almost impossible in view of the Italian and Spanish claims to the French colonial areas, then the occupation of French northern Africa would subsequently become necessary if we were to prevent England from ever regaining possession of the area Mediterranean Sea.

If we had expelled the British from Egypt (and if they had gained a foothold in Greece, then from there too), this path in the eastern part of the Mediterranean would inevitably lead to the countries of the Middle East in the future, especially in view of the fact that it was required would cut off the oil supply routes to England. It was believed that establishing a base in the Middle East would give Germany two advantages. The first is the possibility of a threat to India. The second is an access to the flank of the Soviet Union, which could keep the Soviet Union from entering the war against Germany. I think this line of thinking is wrong. Apart from the fact that it was very doubtful what impact the strengthening of the German army for a long period in the countries of the Middle East would have on the position of these peoples, two conclusions can be drawn:

- operations from the Middle East region against India or against the Soviet Union, for the sole reason of the use of communications, could never be carried out to the extent that would guarantee actual success; England's naval power would always play a decisive role in this case;

- the appearance of Germany in the Middle East would in no way have deterred the Soviet Union from entering the war against Germany; on the contrary, it would have rather led to this.

The whole essence of the issue of the struggle for the Mediterranean region is, in my opinion, the following. Losing positions in the Mediterranean would not be a fatal blow for England. Further, a decisive struggle for the Mediterranean would tie up large German forces for a long time, which would greatly increase the temptation for the Soviet Union to start a war against Germany. This is all the more possible since the prizes he probably wanted, namely the Balkans and dominant influence in the Middle East, could only be won in a war against Germany.

The route across the Mediterranean to achieve victory over England was a roundabout route that can be compared to Napoleon's when he hoped to deal a mortal blow to England by passing through Egypt to India. This path was supposed to distract German forces for a long time in a direction that was by no means decisive. This situation gave, on the one hand, the possibility of arming the British mainland, and on the other, a great chance for the Soviet Union against Germany. The route through the Mediterranean was in reality an evasion of a solution that was not hoped to be achieved in a war against the British Isles. As a result, the third path was chosen, discussed in 1940 - the path of invasion of the British Isles.

Before moving on to this issue, it is necessary to note regarding the conduct of the war in the Mediterranean that in fact, as was often the case later in Russia, Hitler never concentrated the necessary forces in a timely manner. The cardinal mistake was the refusal to capture Malta, which was quite possible to do in an earlier phase of the war. This refusal played a decisive role, in the end, for the subsequent loss of North Africa with all the ensuing consequences. In any case, in July 1940, Hitler drew up a plan for the invasion of the British Isles (but did not make a final decision) and gave instructions for appropriate preparations.

The operation was to be prepared under the encrypted name “Sea Lion”, but carried out only under certain preconditions. The form of this operation, the friction that arose in connection with this issue, primarily between the OKH and the General Headquarters of the Naval Forces, has already been reported by other persons representing the opposing side. They also wrote about the reasons or pretexts that, in the end, were supposed to justify the refusal of this event.

Here I will therefore only touch on three important issues:

– Could an invasion of England force her to give up the fight, that is, would it bring us complete victory if the operation was successful?

– Could we even count on the success of the invasion and what consequences would the failure of this operation have?

– What were the reasons that finally forced Hitler to abandon the invasion and thereby achieve victory over England and turn the army against the Soviet Union?

On the first question, it must be said that an invasion would be the fastest way to defeat England. Both of the other paths we talked about above could not lead to a quick victory. But would this victory be final? It is possible and very likely that Churchill's government, even after the conquest of the British Isles, would have tried to continue the war from Canada. Whether all the dominions would therefore have followed his path is a question we will not discuss. In any case, the conquest of the British Isles would not mean the final defeat of the British Empire.

The most important, apparently, was the following: after the conquest of the British Isles by the Germans, the enemy would lose the base, which, at least then, was necessary for an attack from the sea on the European continent. It was absolutely impossible at that time to carry out an invasion across the Atlantic without using the British Isles as a springboard, even if America entered the war. There is also no doubt that after the victory over England and the disabling of British aviation, the expulsion of the English fleet across the Atlantic and the destruction of the military potential of the British Isles, Germany would be able to quickly improve the situation in the Mediterranean.

It could therefore be said that even if the English government, after the loss of the British Isles, tried to continue the war, it would hardly have a chance of winning it. Would the Dominions follow England in this case?

Would the hidden threat posed by the Soviet Union to Germany cease to exist if the Soviets did not expect to open a “second front” in Europe in the near future? Could Stalin then, with Hitler's consent, turn to Asia?

Would America have undertaken its “crusade” against Germany if it alone had to essentially bear the brunt of the war?

No one can now or could give a decisive answer to this then.

Of course, Germany also did not then have the opportunity to achieve peace on the other side of the seas. One thing is clear: her position after a successful invasion of the British Isles would be incomparably more advantageous than ever as a result of the path that Hitler took.

From a military point of view, therefore, the invasion of England in the summer of 1940, if there was any hope of success in this enterprise, was undoubtedly the right decision. What was to happen, or might happen, if Germany succeeded in this operation, with a view to achieving a no-man's peace, which should always have been the goal of sound German policy, does not belong to the field of military questions.

It is better to return again to the military side of the matter and, therefore, to the decisive question, could the invasion of England in 1940 have been successful?

Of course, opinions are always divided on whether Operation Sea Lion had a chance of success or not. One thing is clear: this operation was associated with extreme risk. A reference to the need for colossal technical equipment that the Allies needed during the invasion in 1944. (landing craft for landing tanks, floating harbors, etc.) is not sufficient to conclude that the German invasion, which was then provided by essentially much more primitive transport means, was a failure. It is also not enough to point out the absolute superiority of the Allies in 1944. in the air and at sea, no matter how important both of these factors are.

On the other hand, if Germany in the summer of 1940 did not even have approximately so many advantages, then it had one decisive advantage, namely the fact that at first it could not encounter any organized defense on the English coast, provided by well-armed, trained and well-led troops. In fact, in the summer of 1940, England was almost completely defenseless on land against invasion. This defenselessness would have been almost complete if Hitler had not allowed the English Expeditionary Force to leave Dunkirk.

The success of the invasion of England in the summer of 1940 depended on two factors:

1. From carrying out this operation as early as possible in order to defeat England on land at the moment of its complete defenselessness and at the same time to take advantage of the favorable meteorological conditions of the summer (in July, August and early September the sea in the English Channel was usually calm).

2. From the ability to sufficiently paralyze the actions of British aviation and navy for the period of crossing and capturing bridgeheads.

It is also obvious that due to the fickleness of the weather, as well as the uncertainty of whether German aircraft would be able to secure air superiority over the English Channel at least for this period, Operation Sea Lion was always associated with a very high risk.

Given this risk, the responsible higher authorities hesitated and considered this operation with many reservations.

Even then it was clear that Hitler was not in the heart for this operation. In the executive bodies one could notice the lack of persistence and energy on the part of the higher authorities during these preparations. General Jodl, the chief of staff for the operational leadership of the armed forces, even saw in this invasion attempt a kind of step of desperation, which the general situation did not force him to take.

Air Force Commander Goering, who, as always, was not strictly controlled by the leadership of the armed forces, did not consider the air war against England, which he led, as part - albeit the most significant - of the invasion operation of the entire German army. The methods of using aviation, which in the end greatly damaged its material and personnel, show rather that he viewed the air war against the British Isles as an independent operational act and directed it in accordance with these guidelines.

The General Headquarters of the Naval Forces, which first raised the question of an invasion of England, when studying the practical possibilities of carrying out this operation, came to the conclusion that this operation could be carried out under certain preconditions. But despite this, he was best aware of the weakness of his means.

Perhaps the most positive position was taken by the OKH, although at first (before the victory over France) it did not at all consider the possibility of invading the British Isles. It is clear, however, that those who primarily risked themselves during Operation Sea Lion - the units of the ground army intended for the invasion - were the ones who prepared most intensively for it and approached this task with faith in success. I think that I have the right to say this, since my subordinate 38 ak was to operate in the first echelon of the invading army, from Boulogne to Bexhill Beachy Head. We were convinced of the possibility of success, but we did not underestimate the dangers. Perhaps, however, we did not know enough about what was troubling the other two branches of the armed forces, especially the navy.

It is known that mainly two reasons, or two pretexts, forced Hitler to ultimately abandon the plan for Operation Sea Lion.

The first is the fact that the preparation of this operation will take a long time, with the result that the first echelon of the invasion will be able to begin the crossing at the earliest on September 24, that is, at a time when - even in the case of a successful operation of the first echelon - there will be no guarantee that meteorological conditions conducive to further operations can be expected in the strait.

The second and decisive circumstance was that our aviation during this period failed to achieve the necessary air superiority over England.

Even if we agree that in September 1940 these factors may have seemed decisive for refusing to invade England, we will not yet answer the question of whether the invasion would have been possible under a different leadership in Germany. But it is these factors that are ultimately at stake when we evaluate Hitler's decision to avoid the decisive battle with England and attack the Soviet Union.

We are talking, therefore, about the question of whether both of these factors - the delay in Operation Sea Lion and the insufficient results of the air battle for England - were inevitable.

As for the first of these factors - delaying the landing until the last ten days of September - it is clear that this could have been avoided. If there had been some kind of "military plan" in which the question of defeating England had also been provided for in advance, then much of the technical preparation for the invasion could have been made before the end of the campaign in the West. If such a plan existed, it would be unthinkable that Hitler would allow the English Expeditionary Force to leave Dunkirk for any reason. At least, delaying the landing until the fall would not have happened if the German leadership had timed the invasion to coincide with the defeat of France, that is, by mid-June, and not by mid-July. Preparations for the invasion on the basis of the order received in July, with full use of all possibilities, could have been completed by mid-September. If the decision had been made four weeks earlier, this would have made it possible to begin crossing the strait already in mid-August.

As for the second factor that caused the abandonment of Operation Sea Lion - the insufficient results of the "air battle for England" - in this regard it is necessary to say the following: the intention to achieve air superiority over England through an isolated air force must be considered a mistake by the military leadership. a war that began many weeks before the earliest date of invasion.

The leadership wanted to ensure the success of the invasion by gaining control of the airspace over England before the invasion. Thus, they only wasted the forces of German aviation in premature battles carried out under unfavorable conditions.

With a sound assessment of their own and enemy forces and capabilities, the command of the air force, at the very least, should have doubts about whether their forces are sufficient and whether they are capable of achieving decisive success in the fight against British aviation and aircraft factories, fighting over England.

At first, the command of the German air force underestimated the British fighter aircraft, overestimated the actions of its bomber aircraft and was taken by surprise by the presence of an effective radar system on the enemy's side. In addition, it was known that our bombers and, above all, fighters had insufficient range and thus insufficient invasion depth. Enemy aircraft were able to escape the attacks we launched, which were aimed at destroying them. Moreover, we are not even talking about the fact that German fighters had to fight over England under more unfavorable conditions than the enemy. Bombers could not receive sufficient fighter cover if they flew beyond the fighters' range. This consideration alone should have prompted the air force command to begin decisive battles against British aviation only at the moment when it would have to take the fight in equal conditions, that is, over the strait or over the coast, in direct operational connection with the invasion.

The German command finally made another mistake by changing the operational objective of the air raids, despite the previously mentioned, partly foreseen, partly unexpected unfavorable fighting conditions, just at the moment when the success of the operation hung in the balance. On September 7, the main direction of attack was shifted to London, a target that had no operational connection with the preparations for the invasion.

However desirable it may have been to achieve air superiority before the invasion began, a sound consideration of all factors should have forced the German High Command to use airpower for the decisive blow only in direct connection with the invasion.

Of course, one could argue that with this method of using the forces of German aviation, it would have too many tasks, namely:

- raids on British air bases in Southern England;

– air cover for landings on ships in French ports;

– protection of transport when crossing the strait;

– support for the first echelon of invasion troops during their landing;

- prohibition of the actions of the English fleet in cooperation with the navy and coastal artillery.

But these problems did not have to be solved all at the same time, although in time they had to be solved quickly one after another. So, for example, the English fleet, with the exception of light ships based in the ports of southern England, could apparently enter into battle only when the first echelon of invasion troops had already landed.

The fate of the battle would depend on the outcome of a major air battle that would take place over the channel or over southern England from the moment the army and navy began operations. In this battle, conditions for German aviation would have been much more favorable than during its raids on the British mainland. This type of warfare would naturally mean that everything would be at stake. But this was the price that had to be paid in those conditions, if they even decided to undertake an invasion.

If Hitler postponed the plan to invade England in September 1940 for the reasons mentioned above, then these reasons may indeed have been valid. That these reasons were revealed at all then depended on the fact that within the German High Command there was no one other than the political figure Hitler who would be responsible for the general direction of military operations. There was no authority that would have prepared a plan for war against England in a timely manner and that would have been able to direct the invasion as a single operation of all three branches of the armed forces.

If the German command in the summer of 1940, as a result of the reasons I have described, missed the chance to successfully end the war with England, then the reasons for this lie, in any case, not only in the shortcomings of the organization of the high command, but to a large extent in Hitler’s political doctrine.

Obviously, there is no doubt that Hitler had a desire to avoid war with England and the British Empire. He often said that it was not in Germany's interests to destroy the British Empire. He believed that it represented a major political achievement. Even if you do not completely trust these statements of Hitler, one thing is still clear: Hitler knew that in the event of the destruction of the British Empire, the heir would not be he or Germany, but America, Japan or the Soviet Union. Based on these considerations, his position towards England will always be clear. He did not want war with England and did not expect it. He wanted, if possible, to avoid a decisive battle with this power. This position of his and the fact that he did not expect such a complete victory over France also explains to us why Hitler did not have a war plan that provided for victory over England after the victory over France. After all, he did not want to land in England. His political concept was contrary to the strategic requirements that emerged after the victory over France. The fatal fact was that his political concept did not find sympathy from the British.

In contrast, Hitler was always opposed to the Soviet Union, although he entered into an agreement with Stalin in 1939. He did not trust this country and at the same time underestimated it. He feared the traditional expansionist aspirations of the Russian state, for which, however, he himself again opened the gates to the West with the Moscow Pact.

It can be assumed that Hitler was aware that someday these two regimes, which had become immediate neighbors, would collide. Further, the politician Hitler was obsessed with the idea of ​​​​"living space", which he considered himself obliged to provide to the German people. He could only look for this living space in the east.

If both of the thoughts I cited allowed for the postponement of the clash with the Soviet Union until a later time, then they should have taken possession of the mind of a man like Hitler with renewed vigor after he, having defeated France, practically became the master of the continent, especially since that threatening concentrations of Soviet troops on Germany's eastern border raised doubts about the Kremlin's future position.

Now Hitler was faced with the question of invading England. He, no doubt, understood the great risk then associated with such an enterprise. If the invasion had failed, the German army and navy forces operating there would have been lost. German air power would also be significantly weakened in this unsuccessful battle. From a purely military point of view, however, even the failure of the invasion of England did not mean such a weakening of German military power that it could not be restored. The political consequences would be more serious. Take, for example, the fact that failure of the invasion would have strengthened the British desire to continue the war. One can further point out the position that America and the Soviet Union would take in this case. But above all, such a clear military defeat, such as the failure of the invasion of England, would have seriously undermined the prestige of the dictator in Germany and throughout the world.

But the dictator could not expose himself to such danger. He always avoided the idea of ​​a decisive battle with England (and due to an incorrect understanding of the English political concept, he flattered himself with the hope of eventually coming to an agreement with this country), so this time he was afraid of the risk. He wanted to avoid the risk of a decisive battle with Great Britain. Instead of defeating that country, he hoped to convince her of the need for an agreement, trying to knock out of her hands the last “continental sword” on which England apparently had her hopes. By avoiding what was undoubtedly a great military and political risk, Hitler made a great mistake. For one thing was clear: if Hitler was afraid to start a battle against England at a favorable moment, then Germany would sooner or later find itself in a critical situation. The longer the war with England dragged on, the greater the danger that threatened Germany from the east.

After Hitler abandoned the decisive battle with England in the summer of 1940 and missed his only chance, he could no longer play the “waiting” game. Under the pressure of necessity, he now decided to try, through a preventive war, to eliminate such an enemy as the Soviet Union, since there was no longer an enemy in the West that would be dangerous to him on the continent.

In reality, Hitler, out of fear of the risk of an invasion of England, took the even greater risk of a war on two fronts. However, due to the late planning of the invasion and the eventual abandonment of it, he lost an entire year. A year that could decide the outcome of the war. A loss of time that Germany could no longer compensate for.

With the cancellation of Operation Sea Lion 38 The corps returned to normal combat life at the end of September. Our transport facilities were withdrawn from ports that were subject to British air raids. But nothing was yet known about Hitler's intentions regarding the Soviet Union, since the final decision to attack the Soviet Union was made much later. I received the first hint of impending events only when I was called in the spring of 1941 to receive a new task.

This book is one of the first works on the history of the Second World War, which provides a description of events in all naval theaters of military operations in the period 1939–1945. The book is written on the basis of documents and materials, a significant part of which is unknown to the Russian reader. The author also used the memories of a number of leading figures of the German Navy - participants in the Second World War. The book is intended for military specialists and a wide range of readers.

Operation Sea Lion

Operation Sea Lion

Before the surrender of France, Hitler's strategy brought great military successes; Therefore, the fact that, having caused England to enter the war, it failed politically, receded into the background, and the significance of the operational error made by him at Dunkirkchen had not yet become clear. Based on his own state of mind, Hitler overestimated his successes; he, and with him the VGKVS (OKW) were sure that England would simply have to go to peace.

This mood probably explains the fact that Hitler did not react for a long time to Raeder’s attempts to find out his attitude towards a possible landing in England. Already in November 1939, the Main Military Fleet ordered the RVM to study this issue, because at that time an offensive in the West seemed to be a matter of the near future, but then it stopped this study, since the offensive was constantly postponed, and the GKA (OKH) was not confident in the ability to quickly achieve success . When such success was nevertheless achieved, Raeder, on May 21, 1940, for the first time reported in detail to Hitler about the study of the issue in the RVM. On June 4, when Raeder complained about the lack of attention to the implementation of the submarine fleet program, Hitler informed him that after the end of the campaign in France he intended to reduce the army, giving priority to the air force and navy. He was clearly more interested in details related to improving Norway's coastal defenses.

On June 18, the British government categorically declared that it would continue the fight under all circumstances. Two days later, the question of landing in England was first brought up for discussion by all participants in the meeting with the Fuhrer. Raeder demanded fierce air raids on British naval bases, as well as the proclamation of a "siege of England." To carry out the landing, he insisted on achieving absolute air supremacy, as well as limiting the amount of materiel that the ground troops would take with them. After this, various details began to be discussed, such as: landing craft, the design of which was of interest to a wide variety of authorities, mine laying, etc. Hitler started talking about an expedition aimed at occupying Iceland, but Raeder dissuaded him from this, because it was not possible to ensure delivery of everything you need there. In general, Hitler was more concerned with plans for creating a new world order than with plans aimed at ending the war. The projects he subsequently put forward for the occupation of the Azores or Canary Islands were even further from reality and, although they were studied, were rejected by Raeder.

Only on July 2, the VGKVS gave the first instructions on preparations for the landing operation under the symbol "Sea Lion". At a meeting with the Fuhrer on July 11, this issue was, in particular, raised; touching him, Raeder directly stated that this operation was for the most extreme case. Hitler agreed with him, but issued “directive No. 16” on July 16. containing an order for all three types of armed forces to begin preparing for the landing. It soon became clear that these preparations could not be completed by 15 August as planned, and that the landing of 40 divisions as had been planned by the army would not be possible for the operation. After lengthy negotiations, the army was content with thirteen divisions, which were supposed to create a main front from Beachy Head to Folkestone, however, with the subsequent landing of new troops in the area from Selsey Bill to Brighton, so that the total length of the front would be 150 km instead of a total length of about 290 km, envisaged in the original landing plan from Lyme Bay (west of the Isle of Wight) to Northforland, located immediately south of the Thames Estuary. The branches of the armed forces did not reach complete unanimity on the question of how to force the strait. In July, the air force operated successfully against enemy shipping; Führer Directive No. 17 of 1 August instead set the goal of an attack on England itself, during which the air force took its own path to total air war.

The Navy, as a result of great exertion of its own forces, as well as thanks to the German coastal fleet and shipping on inland routes, concentrated the following ships at the starting points from Antwerp to Le Havre at the appointed time:

155 transports - 700,000 GRT;

1,277 ferries, barges and lighters, mostly non-propelled;

471 tugs;

1161 motorcycle boots.

At the same time, the construction of heavy batteries at Gris Ne began.

The first of them, the Grosser Elector, with four 28 cm guns, was ready to open fire by August 1. Until mid-September it was followed by the Friedrich-August with three 30.5 cm guns and the Siegfried with four 38 cm guns. However, it was impossible to gain supremacy at sea. True, the expedition to Norway was a success without him; but its success was entirely based on the sudden appearance at the target of small groups of high-speed ships dispersed over the vast expanse of the open sea. Now this was completely excluded. The enemy had powerful air forces; he managed to evacuate 136,000 people with weapons from Northern and Western France, a significant part of those 300,000 people who were given to him by Hitler on the way through Dunkirchen should have already been re-armed. He could send into the threatened area a large number of medium-caliber guns and a number of heavy guns taken from old warships, as well as reserves. Among the German transport vehicles there were only a few ships capable of making a voyage under their own power, climbing onto the shore and immediately unloading troops and materiel through a folding port. Steamboats would have to anchor far from shore; it was estimated that the unloading would last 36 hours - a lost cause within the range of the enemy's still combat-ready air forces. The towing convoys - 33 tugs with two barges each - would have made the crossing at a speed of 2–3 knots. that is, 4–5 km. The speed of the current in the narrow part of the strait, directed against the movement of the tugs, reached 5 miles, that is, 9 km per hour, the width of the strait at the crossing points was at least 40–50 miles, therefore, the crossing should have taken at least 15 hours. At the same time, the expedition was very insufficiently protected from attacks from the flanks. In the presence of strong currents and tides, minefields could at best provide only temporary and relative protection. The naval forces available were represented by only a few destroyers, destroyers and a number of minesweepers. As for aviation, it could not be expected that it would be able to distinguish friend from foe if the towing convoys were attacked by enemy light forces, not to mention the fact that, as one had to assume, it would already have enough to do in connection with the actions of the British military -air forces.

Everything would have turned out completely differently if the government leadership, convinced of the complete success of the planned operation in France, immediately after the war with Poland had shifted its focus to the construction of landing craft like the later self-propelled barges. The latter lifted up to 100 tons of cargo, took three trucks or small tanks, or a corresponding number of people and, having walked 10 miles, could, thanks to the flat bottom, crawl ashore, and thanks to the presence of a folding port, immediately unload. If immediately after Dunkirchen several hundred such ships had been available, plus several more parachute and airborne divisions, then one could count on success with much greater confidence than now, when the enemy had powerful defenses and his own troops had to be transported across an open expanse of water at a speed slightly inferior to that with which Caesar sailed to England 2000 years ago!

It is not surprising that upon closer acquaintance with the details of the operation, none of the interested authorities showed much enthusiasm. Goering showed no interest in her from the very beginning. However, his strike on the British air force did not reach its target, and after he switched to London, German losses began to grow, and were not compensated by corresponding successes. The enemy had all the advantages on his side here: an extensive command communications network, a comprehensive radar surveillance system, and the possibility of massive use of fighters. It would have been much more difficult for him to defend his poorly armed merchant ships and numerous ports, and German attacks on these objects would not have cost such large losses. Under the current conditions, the enemy was even able to launch a counter-offensive in early September and bomb the invasion fleet at its bases, and 21 transports, 214 barges and 5 tugs were sunk or damaged - about 10% of the total tonnage of the allocated transport fleet. As a result, in the second half of September this fleet was partially dispersed, which, if the operation had been carried out, would have led to a loss of time. On October 12, the operation was finally postponed until next spring; thus it was finished with her. Hitler turned out to be as incapable as Napoleon of securing dominance on the English Channel for at least 24 hours.