Preparation of a new union treaty. Collapse of the USSR A new union treaty was signed in the USSR

The signing of the new Union Treaty, scheduled for August 20, 1991, prompted conservatives to take decisive action, since the agreement deprived the top of the CPSU of real power, posts and privileges. According to the secret agreement of M. Gorbachev with B. Yeltsin and the President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev, which became known to KGB Chairman V. Kryuchkov, after signing the agreement it was planned to

replace the Prime Minister of the USSR V. Pavlov with N. Nazarbayev. The same fate awaited the Minister of Defense, Kryuchkov himself, and a number of other high-ranking officials.

Another immediate reason for the development of events was the decree of the Russian President of July 20, 1991 on the departition of state institutions in the RSFSR, which dealt a strong blow to the monopoly of the CPSU. Locally, the party nomenklatura began to be ousted from regional structures and replaced with new ones.

On the eve of the signing of a new union treaty in the absence of USSR President M.S. Gorbachev, who was at that time on vacation in Foros, on the morning of August 19, television and radio announced the creation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP), which included Vice President Yanaev, Prime Minister Pavlov, KGB Chairman Kryuchkov, and a number of other senior officials . The State Emergency Committee declared its intention to restore order in the country and prevent the collapse of the Union. A state of emergency was introduced in the country, democratic newspapers were closed, and censorship was tightened.

By introducing a state of emergency, the “Gekachepists” hoped to bring the country back: to eliminate glasnost, the multi-party system, and commercial structures. In the address “To the Soviet People”, the State Emergency Committee declared itself a true defender of democracy and reforms, generously promising to benefit all layers of Soviet society in the shortest possible time - from pensioners to entrepreneurs. AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

The main events of these days unfolded in Moscow. On August 19, tanks and armored personnel carriers were brought into the capital, blocking the main highways of the city. A curfew was declared. However, these actions caused a backlash. The putschists miscalculated the main thing - during the years of perestroika, Soviet society changed a lot. Freedom has become the highest value for people, fear has completely disappeared. Most of the country's population refused to support unconstitutional methods of overcoming the crisis. By the evening of August 19, tens of thousands of Muscovites rushed to the House of Soviets of the RSFSR; the townspeople were promised land plots.

Resistance to the measures of the State Emergency Committee was led by B.N. Yeltsin and the Russian leadership. They organized their supporters for protest rallies and construction of barricades near the parliament building. The troops brought into Moscow refused to shoot at the people. Given the virtual inaction of the State Emergency Committee, Yeltsin’s supporters managed to quickly turn the situation in their favor. On August 22, members of the State Emergency Committee were arrested.

An analysis of the events of August 19–21, 1991 shows that their outcome was influenced not so much by force factors or the legal validity of the positions of the parties, but by a sense of the political situation, the ability to gather one’s supporters at the right time and in the right place and put the enemy in such conditions as which even numerical or force superiority will not bring him victory.

One of the main goals of the State Emergency Committee was to “put pressure” on the Russian leadership, force them to sit down at the negotiating table and formulate conditions for the future Union Treaty that would be acceptable for preserving the USSR and leading the country out of the crisis. At the same time, its leaders, not without reason, counted on the rejection of M.S. by the majority of the population. Gorbachev and the lack of a mass stable political base in Yeltsin, as well as on the allied leaders, the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the SA of the USSR, subordinate to them. However, they underestimated the informational, political and organizational “mobilization”, the uncompromising position, the willingness of opponents to go “to the end”, as well as the population’s rejection of military intervention.

The Tbilisi, Baku and Vilnius “syndromes”, when the army was used against extremists, but was subjected to blasphemy for raising arms against the “civilian population”, made it difficult and even made it almost impossible to attract it to active action in Moscow. But in those cases, the use of the Armed Forces was still preceded by major provocations, and in the capital everything took on the appearance of a “top showdown.” The position of those who proposed to involve the army to exert psychological pressure prevailed in the State Emergency Committee. As Marshal D.T. later said. Yazov, he agreed to join the Committee with the firm reservation that the army would be assigned the role of a passive pressing force. The reluctance of the security forces (army, KGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs) to participate in political “showdowns”, the active rejection of the State Emergency Committee by a number of high-ranking military men largely predetermined the outcome of the confrontation that began on August 19.

On the night of August 20-21, an incident occurred that was destined to have a significant impact on the development of the political situation. Under strange circumstances, three young men from among the “defenders” of the White House died.

The subsequent investigation of these events showed that what happened was, rather, not an accident, but the result of a premeditated provocation. Nevertheless, the fact that the blood of “civilians” was shed by the military subordinate to the State Emergency Committee was the last straw, which predetermined the end of the hesitations of the already unstable supporters of the Committee, allowing the Russian leadership to launch a full-scale political offensive against their opponents and win a complete and unconditional victory.

On the morning of August 21, the Board of the USSR Ministry of Defense spoke out in favor of the withdrawal of troops from Moscow and the abolition of high alert.

The August events and the victory of the Russian leadership contributed to a sharp acceleration of the development of political processes and a change in the balance of power in the country. The Communist Party, which compromised itself by the participation of members of its highest bodies in the coup, was banned. USSR President Gorbachev essentially began to play a decorative role. Most of the republics refused to sign the Union Treaty after the coup attempt. The question of the continued existence of the USSR was on the agenda.

In an attempt to get rid of the discredited center, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus met in Minsk in December 1991 and announced the termination of the 1922 Union Treaty and the intention to create the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). It united 11 former Soviet republics (excluding Georgia and the Baltic states.

2. The collapse of the USSR and the “parade of sovereignties”

collapse political parade sovereignty

After the August crisis, a situation arose when the decisions made by leaders were determined not by the Constitution and laws of the USSR, but by the real balance of forces and differently understood “political expediency.” Republican authorities acted without regard to the Union Center. The State Emergency Committee's speech became a convenient reason for abandoning serious integration proposals. From the end of August, the dismantling of allied political and government structures began at an increasing pace. On this basis, some historians believe that in reality the Soviet Union “died” immediately after August, continuing to formally exist until the end of the year.

Preparation of its draft began in August 1990. Representatives of 12 union republics took part in it, with the exception of the Baltic republics. On March 17, 1991, an all-Union referendum was held on the issue of preserving the USSR, which sounded as follows: “Do you consider it necessary to preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms of people of any nationality will be fully guaranteed? "

After the referendum, the development of the draft Union Treaty went faster. On April 23, 1991, a meeting of the leaders of 9 union republics and M.S. took place in Novo-Ogarevo (the country residence of M.S. Gorbachev). Gorbachev. The leaders of the Baltic republics, Georgia, Armenia and Moldova did not take part in the negotiations. Orlov A.S., Georgiev V.A., Georgieva N.G., Sivokhina T.A. History of Russia 3rd ed., revised. and additional - M.: Prospekt, 2006.--528 p.

Here, agreement in principle was reached to develop such an agreement, but significant disagreements emerged about the balance of powers between the republics and the center. Further work on the text of the Union Treaty was called the “Novo-Ogarevo process.” The project was ready in June and published in print in August. His articles were quite contradictory. The Soviet Union as a single state actually ceased to exist. The Union republics became independent subjects of international law, their powers were significantly expanded, and they could freely enter and leave the USSR. Aspects of social life were within the competence of the republics. The abbreviation USSR stood for Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics. The signing of the agreement was scheduled for August 20, but due to a sharp change in the political situation in the country, it was never signed.

This project did not suit the top leaders of the CPSU and the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, who demanded emergency powers on the eve of its publication and never received them at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. But at the same time, this document no longer satisfied the newly elected President of Russia and radical democrats. Gorbachev, therefore, experienced sharp pressure both from the top Soviet leadership, especially the heads of the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, and from the radical wing of supporters of the continuation of democratic reforms.

In order to disrupt the signing of this agreement and maintain their powers of power, part of the top party and state leadership tried to seize power. On August 18, several “security officials” came to M.S., who was vacationing in Foros in Crimea. Gorbachev and offered him to sign a decree introducing a state of emergency in the country, but was refused. Returning to Moscow, they announced that Gorbachev could not serve as President of the USSR “for health reasons” and his powers were transferred to Vice President G.I. Yanaev. On August 19, 1991, a state of emergency was declared in the country. Troops were concentrated around the building of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR (“White House”), who were supposed to occupy the building, disperse parliament and arrest its most active participants.

The coup was led by the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP)/

The State Emergency Committee saw the main task of the coup in restoring the order in the USSR that existed before 1985, i.e. in the elimination of the multi-party system, commercial structures, in the destruction of the sprouts of democracy.

But the coup failed. The population of the country basically refused to support the State Emergency Committee, while the army did not want to use force against the citizens of their state. Already on August 20, barricades grew up around the “White House”, on which there were several tens of thousands of people, some military units went over to the side of the defenders. On August 22, the putsch was defeated, and members of the State Emergency Committee were arrested.

After the defeat of the putsch, the collapse of the USSR, which began in the late 80s, took on an avalanche-like character. Republican authorities were interested in a radical redistribution of power in their favor long before the fall of 1991. Behind them were the interests of local political elites, both new ones, who had risen in the wake of perestroika, and old ones, the party nomenklatura. The highest body by agreement between the republics was the State Council of the USSR, created in September 1991 under the leadership of M.S. Gorbachev. The latter tried with all his might to resume the “Novo-Ogarevo process,” but no one took him into account.

In September, in agreement with the Supreme Councils and presidents of several republics, the Inter-Republican Economic Committee (IEC) was created, headed by I.S. Silaev. He prepared an economic agreement, which was signed by nine republics: the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. Armenia participated in the committee as an observer, the Baltic states sent their representatives. Only Moldova and Georgia completely ignored this agreement. This agreement was a real step designed to stop the collapse of a single economic organism. However, the economic crisis continued, and, in an effort to mitigate it, the republics and even individual regions introduced serious restrictions on the export of various products and goods from them.

After the declaration of independence, relations between the republics on border issues worsened. A number of peoples of the North Caucasus, part of the RSFSR, declared independence and sovereignty and made political and territorial claims both to the RSFSR and to their neighbors. This was most clearly manifested in the emergence of the Chechen Republic, which separated from the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic of the RSFSR. Events in Chechnya and a number of other regions of the North Caucasus, the ongoing war in South Ossetia - all this brought the Caucasus by the end of 1991 to the brink of a comprehensive civil war. Self-proclaimed republics also appeared on the territory of other union states (Gagauzia in Moldova, Abkhazia in Georgia, etc.)

The economic situation in Russia and other states of the former USSR in the fall and winter of 1991 was rapidly deteriorating. Inflation rates increased sharply, industrial and agricultural production decreased. By the end of 1991, there were practically no industrial goods or food left on store shelves. Problems arose in supplying the population with the basic necessities: bread, milk, potatoes. For many categories of the population, especially pensioners and young people, the problem of survival has arisen.

Trying to stop the collapse of the state and realizing that in new conditions the use of old forms and methods cannot bring positive results, the leadership of the USSR attempted to create a new legal basis for the existence of the Union. Based on the fact that the form of state unity of the country that actually developed in previous years is subject to merciless criticism, and to some extent justified, the path of changing it was chosen.

On June 20, 1990, the first working meeting of representatives of the republics took place to prepare proposals for the new Union Treaty. The position of the reformers was presented in the speech of R.N. Nishanov, who, on behalf of the Federation Council, spoke in favor of multivariate forms of federal structure, implying a variety of relations between the Soviet republics, as well as between each of them and the Union. His speech put forward the idea that the forms of inter-republican ties can vary from federal to confederal. This position of the representatives of the Union, in fact, contributed to its further collapse due to the fact that this recognized the uselessness of the USSR in its existing form. At the same time, the USSR could exist only by performing those functions that were assigned to it historically. By abandoning them, he also abandoned his historical perspective. Therefore, the first statements of the Union leaders about the possibility of confederal ties between the republics were at the same time a statement of the rejection of the USSR as a state.

It cannot be said that the leadership of the USSR did nothing to stop the actions of the republics that were destroying the Union. In the resolution of the Congress of People's Deputies "On the situation of the country and priority measures to overcome the current crisis socio-economic and political situation", adopted on December 24, 1990, in addition to the fact that the prospect of a final settlement of relations between the center and the republics was still associated with the conclusion of a new The Union Treaty also contained specific provisions that, according to the authors and legislators, should have normalized relations in the federation. In particular, in contrast to the declarations of the republics on state sovereignty, the supremacy of the laws of the USSR was confirmed throughout its entire territory, albeit with some reservations: “Prior to the signing of the Union Treaty, those laws of the republics are in force that do not contradict the Constitution of the USSR, as well as the laws of the USSR adopted within its boundaries.” powers". In addition, the President of the USSR, together with senior officials of the republics, was ordered to develop and sign by the end of 1990 a Temporary Agreement on Economic Issues for 1991, which would allow the formation of the budgets of the Union and the republics. The leadership of the republics, territories and regions was required to lift restrictions that prevent the movement of food, consumer goods, and material resources for their production across the country.

The problem of the Union Treaty is also returned to in the resolution “On the general concept of the new Union Treaty and the procedure for its conclusion”, adopted on December 25, 1990 by the Congress of People's Deputies of the Union, which spoke of the need to preserve the old name and integrity of the state, transforming it into a voluntary equal union sovereign republics - a democratic federal state. It was thought that the renewed Union should be based “on the will of peoples and the principles set out in the declarations of republics and autonomies on state sovereignty, designed to ensure: the equality of all citizens of the country, regardless of their nationality and place of residence; the equality of peoples, whatever their number, their the inalienable right to self-determination and free democratic development, the territorial integrity of the constituent entities of the federation; guarantees of the rights of national minorities...".

As a result of the hard work of scientists and politicians, representatives of the center and the republics in Novo-Ogarevo, a draft Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States was agreed upon, which, after changes and clarifications made by representatives of the republics, the Federation Council and the preparatory committee formed by the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, was published and sent for consideration to the Supreme Councils of the republics and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

In the process of developing the new Union Treaty, the question arose about the place and role of autonomies. This was the subject of the meeting of the President of the USSR and the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR with the chairmen of the Supreme Councils of the autonomous republics, which took place on May 12, 1991 in the Kremlin. It confirmed that the autonomous republics were signing the Union Treaty as members of the USSR and the RSFSR. However, the representative of Tatarstan, Shaimiev, stated that his republic intends to sign the Treaty only as a member of the USSR with the subsequent conclusion of an agreement with Russia.

On February 15, 1991, a meeting of the foreign ministers of the USSR and union republics and their representatives took place. The forum participants decided to create the Council of Foreign Ministers of the USSR and Union Republics, which will represent a mechanism for the participation of the republics in the development, implementation and coordination of foreign policy activities of the USSR, specific discussion of international problems, and finding solutions on organizational and other issues. The main goal of creating the Council is interaction for a more complete and harmonious consideration of the interests of the Union and the republics in the foreign policy sphere.

In August 1991, a turning point occurred in the life of the Soviet country. This was the beginning of the collapse of the USSR. A completely new political situation was created. The leadership of our republic from the very beginning of the reforms - from 1989-1990 - adhered to the line that helped maintain harmony and stability within the republic itself and build new - partnership, mutually respectful relations with both the union and federal centers.

The signing of the Union Treaty and the changes planned after it in the composition of the top leadership of the USSR were perceived by the conservative part of the communist nomenklatura as a threat to personal power, and they attempted a coup d'etat.

The first president of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Mikhail Efimovich Nikolaev, talks about that time, about the main events of 1991.

Union Treaty

Mikhail Efimovich, 20 years have already passed since those memorable events...

For me, this is not twenty years ago. For me this is yesterday. And I always remember these days, very tragic days... So, the events of those years stand before my eyes, as if it were yesterday...

Let us remember the events that preceded the coup. The main event of 1991 was supposed to be the signing of a new Union Treaty. On May 12, a meeting between the leaders of the autonomous republics and the President of the USSR Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev took place. As I understand, it confirmed the previously made fundamental decision that the autonomous republics would also sign the new union treaty. Mikhail Efimovich, please tell us how this meeting was prepared, how did it go?

Yes, indeed, during the period of government reform, the autonomous republics took an active part in the discussion and development of documents. At one time, a law was adopted by the Supreme Council of the USSR, according to which the powers and rights of the autonomous republics were equal to the union republics. Preparations for a new union treaty were in full swing. And suddenly a message comes out in the press that the union treaty will be signed by the union republics and the center, known as the “9+1” formula. And nothing was said about autonomous republics. 9 are the then Union republics, excluding the Baltic republics, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and plus one - the President of the Soviet Union Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev.

This was in April. Having received this message, I called the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin. Showing bewilderment and concern, he asked whether the previously adopted agreements that the union treaty would be signed by the autonomous republics, along with the union ones, had been revised? And he asked for his consent so that we, the chairmen of the presidiums of the Supreme Soviets of the autonomous republics, would gather with him for consultation. He agreed.

This was before the May holidays. Boris Nikolaevich asked: “Let’s do it after Victory Day.” Well, I informed Mintimer Shaimiev, Murtaza Rakhimov about this, asked them, since they are closer, to inform the leaders of other autonomous republics that I have an agreement to meet with Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin for consultation on Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev’s statement about “9+1” " They agreed, and we gathered on May 10 with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin.

And before that, on May 7, we, the leaders of the republics, signed our appeal regarding “9+1”. They asked Yeltsin what line we should follow, how he felt about this statement, what significance he attached. He said that he was aware of the matter, knew about the statement and offered: “if you have such a great desire, I will arrange a meeting with Mikhail Sergeevich.” I immediately called him on the turntable. Gorbachev said that today or tomorrow he won’t be able to, “let’s do it the day after tomorrow.” And so on May 12, in the afternoon, we gathered with Mikhail Sergeevich in the Kremlin.

Opening the meeting, Mikhail Sergeevich emphasized that it was being held at the request of the chairmen of the Supreme Councils of the autonomous republics. Boris Nikolaevich gave the first word to me, since I was the initiator of the meeting. I expressed the opinion of my colleagues, the chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of the republics. The point was that in this tense time it is impossible to deviate from previously accepted agreements, this creates artificial stress and tension, so we must, I said, find a common language with you. We believe that, as previously agreed, the leaders of the autonomous republics should take part in the preparation and signing of the new union treaty. Moreover, we in Russia, in the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, have already decided that the signature of B.N. Yeltsin from the RSFSR will come first, and then the signatures of all the leaders of the autonomous republics. This has already been a decision of the Supreme Council of Russia. Well, he also outlined a number of economic points.

Then my other colleagues came out with support. In the end, it was decided to move away from the formula “union republics + president of the Soviet Union” and return to the original version. After that, we began to take an active part in the so-called Novo-Ogaryovo process (Novo-Ogaryovo is the residence of M.S. Gorbachev near Moscow - O.S.).

Then, with short breaks in June-July, they continued to work. Almost in July we completed the preparation of the document and signed off on everything page by page, item by article. Two controversial articles remain. This is about the tax system and customs taxes. Then, through joint efforts, a consensus was reached: to instruct Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin, Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev and Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev to make a decision. They had to agree on these two articles, find an acceptable solution, and sign. And we, trusting them, agree with their decision. And then submit the Agreement for signing on August 20. On this we parted ways.

- Did Boris Yeltsin also agree?

Yes, he agreed.

Three days in August

How did the August events take place?

At the very beginning of August, on the 4th, I think, a message arrived: M.S. Gorbachev took a vacation and went on vacation. And then we officially received a telegram from the Kremlin in Yakutsk with the following content: the signing of the Union Treaty is scheduled for August 20 at 2 pm. The composition of the delegation is so many people, decide. And we made our decision and flew out on August 18, staying at the Moscow and Rossiya hotels. On the 19th, early in the morning, at 6 o’clock, Kliment Yegorovich Ivanov called (he was part of the delegation) and said: “Urgently turn on the TV, they are transmitting an important message.” I turned on the TV, at which time the announcer read out the message that the State Emergency Committee had been created, its appeal, orders.

Then we all quickly gathered. Taras Gavrilyevich Desyatkin, Sofron Petrovich Danilov, Kliment Egorovich Ivanov... All those who were. We got together and started discussing what to do. Then they gave me instructions to contact all the chairmen of the Supreme Councils of the autonomous republics and try to go to the Kremlin, find out the details in order to decide on further actions. I called my colleagues using the turntable and agreed to meet at 9 o’clock in the morning in the lobby of the Moscow Hotel. We met and agreed that we should go to the Kremlin.

They called, couldn’t find anyone, then they got through to Anatoly Ivanovich Lukyanov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. And we agreed on 11 o'clock. After breakfast, I told Kliment Yegorovich: “Go to the White House, find out the situation, get advice on our further actions. And then we will meet at the Moscow Hotel. And we went at the appointed time with our colleagues to the Kremlin. We went to Anatoly Lukyanov and started asking what was the matter, what the situation was, what caused it, etc.

- Who took part?

All the chairmen of the Supreme Councils of the autonomous republics who came to the signing. He says, yes, Mikhail Sergeevich really fell ill. “You yourself saw how he worked day and night. Yes, indeed, he was ill, that’s it. You heard about this, you know from the State Emergency Committee’s appeal.” He also said that he himself was taken to Moscow at night. By helicopter. He was vacationing in Valdai then. “I arrived at night, so I don’t know what’s going on.”

We understood that he was not telling us something. We say, come on, organize a meeting with the vice-president, chairman of the State Emergency Committee Gennady Yanaev. Lukyanov agreed, called, and he scheduled it for 3 p.m. When we came to Yanaev, he was in a very difficult condition - spiritual, physical, moral. In general terms, he outlined what was stated in the appeal. At this time there is a call. B.N. Yeltsin called. I asked Yanaev why his car was not allowed into the Kremlin, that he had sent his appeal. Yanaev says: “I’ll figure it out, I don’t know about the matter, it’s impossible that your car won’t be allowed in.” The conversation ended there.

We, too, without really receiving any explanation, left the Kremlin. One thing they understood was that there was no written statement from Gorbachev about his resignation. We go out and see that all of Moscow is filled with tanks. All areas, etc. I came to the Moscow Hotel. Kliment Yegorovich was waiting for me and said that he could not get to the White House. There are barricades there, barricaded. Well, what to do next? I say: “Let’s go to the permanent mission,” it was then located in Kolpachny Lane. From there I called the agency and asked to book two seats on the evening flight. And we went to the port of Domodedovo. On the 20th I was already there, in Yakutsk.

You returned on time. I remember that many in Yakutsk were ready to support the State Emergency Committee, the regional committee of the Communist Party prepared a project on the creation of a republican State Emergency Committee, and tried to pass it through the Presidium of the Supreme Council. Or the same Pavel Pavlovich Borodin, chairman of the Yakutsk City Executive Committee. Only you took a firm position - the supremacy of the laws of the RSFSR and the republic. What was your confidence, your position based on?

As I already said, while in Moscow, I saw with my own eyes the leaders of the putschists and became convinced that they were lying. It was clear that these were illegal, unconstitutional actions. And we acted in accordance with our laws, the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Republic. From the very beginning, I knew and supported the position of the leadership of the Russian Federation, President Boris Yeltsin. Remember, we elected him on June 12, 1991 as the first president of the RSFSR. I saw prospects for the development of the republic as part of the renewed Russian Federation. Believed in it. It was impossible, impossible to return, especially through unconstitutional force, to the times of the dictatorship of one party. We were right.

- Mikhail Efimovich, from today’s point of view, how to evaluate these events? In your opinion, what was it?

A sign of weakness, the agony of the existing government. CPSU authorities. In my opinion, it was necessary to simply gather people in the square, come out to the same vice-president, who was performing the functions of supreme power at that time, and tell him about his vision of how we should continue to live. If they, the Gekachepists, did not agree with Gorbachev’s policies. And to stop the reforms by force of arms at that time was unthinkable, bordering on stupidity, because the people were in such a tense state at that time that it was tantamount to adding fuel to the fire. And that's what happened. You need to negotiate with the people peacefully, if you have something to say, if you want to change something, you need to consult with the people, ask: this is our opinion, how do you look at it.

- Was the purpose of the State Emergency Committee to disrupt the signing of a new union treaty?

Undoubtedly. They did not want this union treaty to be signed. There was only one goal - to disrupt.

But if the agreement had been signed then... Here, from the point of view of the republic, Yakutia. Was this beneficial to us? How would it influence the development of the republic?

Definitely positive. As I already said, we agreed that the agreement would be signed by the union and autonomous republics on an equal basis. At that time, there were very serious questions about property and the tax system. That is, basically, economic issues were resolved. And this is what we sought.

- And the agreement gave answers to these questions?

Absolutely right. And on the basis of this agreement, we would still sign agreements with the Russian Federation on the delimitation of property and delimitation of powers.

- The next step...

Yes. We all - both the people and the government - were united in one thing: to democratize. Both the state and society. Give more independence to the republics. The Union Treaty was called: “Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States.” Do you understand? So, today an attempt is being made to return to the provisions of that draft. For example, the introduction of a single customs tax. Create a single space in trade. Right? Single ruble. These same issues should have been resolved by that failed union treaty, and all other issues of the republic should have been resolved independently. That is, there were more rights to development in this agreement than in the former Soviet Union.

About Mikhail Gorbachev

Who were the key figures in developing the treaty? Gorbachev?

I wouldn't say that he alone was the main figure. There were personalities who were in no way inferior to him. These are Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin, Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev, Islam Abduganievich Karimov. Here they are, these four most prominent figures, played the role of the first violin in drawing up the project, determining the main vectors of development of the new Union.

- This year Mikhail Gorbachev turned 80 years old. Please tell us about your meetings with him.

My first meeting with Gorbachev took place after I was elected chairman of the Supreme Council of the Yakut-Sakha SSR in July 1990. The first meeting lasted 45 minutes. I put three questions to him; they were not demands or requests in nature. I wanted to consult and find out his opinion on these issues. He told us what our socio-economic situation is, and that in order to resolve problematic issues we plan to address our proposals to the union government.

He then supported much of what I said. During the last two years, 1990-91, while the union government was working, we communicated quite often. I attended a reception and met during the Novoogaryov trial. I must say, however, that Mikhail Sergeevich, according to my observations, it was during these two years that the real affairs of Mikhail Sergeevich began to diverge from what he stated. I did not feel his dominance over the above-mentioned individuals. After their speeches and objections, he began to hesitate and change his decisions. I think this shows the character of a person, his will as a leader. Still, here he conceded.

And he is a pleasant person, an intellectual. He did a lot to democratize the country, the Soviet Union, end the Cold War with the West, and changed not only our country, but also the world. Historical figure.

- Was his visit to Yakutia planned?

No. Because I invited Boris Nikolaevich more persistently. We are part of the Russian Federation, so, first of all, the leader of Russia had to come. I addressed the Prime Minister of the USSR Valentin Pavlov with an invitation to discuss and solve socio-economic problems. He respected, if you remember, he came.

- Did you meet with Gorbachev after 1991?

Yes, sure. After a certain time after his resignation from the post of President of the USSR, he was constantly invited to events, meetings, banquets, and holidays. Sometimes they sat at the same table. At Moscow State University, at the anniversary of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, for example. We talked, sometimes remembered the August events, and in general, our joint work, he remembered me well.

Recorded by Oleg Sidorov.

Reference:

Mikhail Efimovich Nikolaev was born on November 13, 1937 in Oktemsky nasleg, Ordzhonikidze district of Yakutia.

In 1961 he graduated from the Omsk Veterinary Institute. From 1969 to 1971 he studied at the Higher Party School under the CPSU Central Committee.

After graduating from the institute, he worked as the chief veterinarian of the Zhigansky district. Then he moved to Komsomol work: first secretary of the Zhigansky district Komsomol committee, head of the department of Komsomol bodies of the Yakut regional Komsomol committee, first secretary of the Yakut city Komsomol committee.

After completing his studies at the Higher Party School - at the party job: secretary, since 1973 - first secretary of the Verkhnevilyuisky district committee of the CPSU. In 1975, he was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Yakutia.

From 1979 to 1985 - Minister of Agriculture of the Republic. In 1985, he was elected secretary of the Yakut regional committee of the CPSU. Deputy of the Supreme Council of Yakutia 9-11 convocations. On December 8, 1989, he was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Yakutia.

On March 4, 1990, he was elected people's deputy of the Russian Federation and Yakutia, a member of the constitutional commission of the Russian Federation.

Since December 20, 1991 - President of Yakutia. On December 28, 1991, he took the oath. At the same time, Yakutia was renamed the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia).

In January 1992, he simultaneously headed the government of the republic.

On December 12, 1993, he was elected as a deputy of the Federation Council from Yakutia. Joined the International Affairs Committee.

Representative in the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation from the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). Appointed - January 28, 2002.

On April 25, 2008, at the 221st meeting, the Federation Council confirmed the powers and approved the position of Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council, senator from the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia).

Since 2011 - State Advisor to the President of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia).

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Innokenty Adyasov, member of the Expert Analytical Council under the Committee on CIS Affairs of the State Duma - especially for RIA Novosti.

The first meeting to prepare the agreement took place on May 24, 1991 at the residence of the President of the USSR Novo-Ogarevo near Moscow (hence the name of the process). Representatives of nine republics took part in it: the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the BSSR, Azerbaijan and five Central Asian ones.

After long and at times very tense discussions, a compromise was reached in June: the USSR should transform into a soft federation. The issues of defense, security, foreign policy, common financial policy (issue of the union currency), and common infrastructure remained with the union center. Most economic issues, issues of social and cultural policy were transferred to the jurisdiction of the union republics, and citizenship of the union republics was introduced.

It was assumed that the President of Kazakhstan would become the new head of the union government. The prepared Union Treaty was considered open for signature by all republics from August 20, 1991.

Russia's position

By August 1991, there was no consensus in the environment about the new Union Treaty. In general, the position of the Russian leadership on concluding the agreement was extremely ambivalent. On the one hand, Boris Yeltsin advocated the creation of a renewed Union, on the other, since the winter of 1991, negotiations had been ongoing on the creation of a kind of confederation of Russia-Ukraine-Belarus-Kazakhstan “horizontally” without the participation of the Union Center.

Few people know that the first attempt to conclude the “Belovezhskaya Accords” was made back in February 1991. This idea was actively supported by Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk, then the head of the Supreme Council of Ukraine. However, Belarusian Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich and the head of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev opposed it.

A consistent supporter of the Union Treaty was the acting chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, Ruslan Khasbulatov, although he expressed certain complaints about its text. In an interview with Radio Liberty in August 2001, Ruslan Khasbulatov recalled: “Yeltsin and I argued a lot - should we go to the meeting on August 20? And finally, I convinced Yeltsin, saying that if we didn’t even go there, we wouldn’t form a delegation , this will be perceived as our desire to destroy the Union."

The position of the Russian leadership was monitored extremely closely in other union republics, primarily in Ukraine.

Ukraine's position

Anti-union sentiments in the summer of 1991 were strong only in the West of Ukraine and partly in Kyiv. The center of Ukraine and the Left Bank actively advocated signing the agreement and preserving the Union - in the referendum, more than 70 percent of Ukrainian citizens voted for it.

The Ukrainian government was most concerned about protecting the republic’s consumer market. In November 1990, cards were introduced in Ukraine. Since that time, Ukrainians, along with wages in Soviet rubles, began to receive multi-colored “sheets of coupons”, without which it was difficult to buy something in the state trade system.

Some Ukrainian experts began to retroactively declare that even then Ukraine began to introduce its own currency. To put it mildly, they are disingenuous. Residents of Russian megacities remember the same coupons for almost all consumer goods - from cigarettes to sugar.
The consumer market crisis was common to everyone. Meanwhile, against the backdrop of the all-Union crisis, many would-be economists have appeared, stubbornly arguing that “Ukraine feeds the entire Union” and that in a few years an independent Ukraine will certainly become a “second France.”

For the sake of objectivity, it must be said that such conversations were then very popular in Russia. “The Union republics hang a heavy burden on our economy,” sounded a persistent refrain.

Contrary to the popular cliché, the West was not interested in the collapse of the USSR in the summer of 1991. Another socialist federation, Yugoslavia, was already creeping into civil war, and getting a new source of tension with nuclear weapons would be too much.

During a visit to Kyiv in early August 1991, the then US President conveyed to the Ukrainian leadership that the United States was not interested in the emergence of an independent Ukraine.

Why didn't the Union take place?

After 20 years, the question arises again: did the new Union have a chance?

According to a direct and active participant in those events, the former President of Tatarstan Mentimer Shaimiev, “be that as it may, the Union had a real chance of being preserved by granting broad powers to the union republics.”

It must be said that a personal factor played a huge role in disrupting the process of creating a new Union. In rejection of the confederation, seemingly opposing forces united in the most surprising way. On the one hand, they were the “guardians” of the former USSR from the conservative wing of the party and state leadership (the actions of the putschists were aimed, first of all, at disrupting the signing of the new Union Treaty). On the other hand, there were the pseudo-democratic elites that were actively forming at that time, represented by people from the republican leadership of the CPSU, who wanted full power in their territories - the former union republics. Russia, led by its leader Yeltsin, was no exception in this sense.

After the failure of the State Emergency Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev still tried to revive the Novoogarevo process and create at least some kind of formation on the ruins of the USSR.

On December 9, 1991, the seven republics (excluding Ukraine and Azerbaijan) were scheduled to sign an agreement on the creation of a confederal Union with its capital in Minsk.

However, on December 8, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus announced in Belovezhskaya Pushcha the dissolution of the USSR and.

The majority of the population of the three Slavic republics believed that the Commonwealth would become a new format of the Union, but these hopes were not justified.

Twenty years later

None of the former Soviet republics, including the Baltic pioneers of secession from the USSR, oil-producing Azerbaijan and Russia itself, benefited from the collapse of a single state, or more precisely, from the destruction of a common economic space.

The Soviet economy had a very high level of cooperation, up to 80 percent of products were created jointly and then distributed among the republics. The collapse of the all-Union market led to a collapse in production, galloping inflation, and the disappearance of knowledge-intensive industries.

The most indicative in this regard are the problems of Ukraine after gaining independence. The Ukrainian aerospace industry, due to the severance of cooperation ties with Russia and lack of funding, has significantly reduced production volumes; many extremely promising projects that are at a high stage of readiness have been mothballed.

20 years later, many of the ideas contained in the draft Union Treaty again become relevant during the creation of the Eurasian Union. and the EurAsEC SES are actually the first stages of creating a new Union, primarily of an economic orientation.

Hopefully, the current political elites of post-Soviet states will be wise enough not to repeat the mistakes of 20 years ago.